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PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA

No. 5, Sep-Oct 1983

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28 February 1984

USSR REPORT

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No. 5, Sep-Oct 1983

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents, the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal NARODY AZII I AFRIKI published in Moscow by the Oriental Studies Institute and the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

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ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF MAJOR ARTICLES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 83 pp 220-222

[Text] Topical Problems of Soviet Oriental Studies, by Ye. M. Primakov

The article is based on the report submitted to the Second All-Union Conference of Oriental Scholars in Baku (May 1983) by the President of the All-Union Association of Oriental Scholars, Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician Ye. M. Primakov. The article analyzes the most topical problems confronting Soviet oriental scholars in linguistics, the history of literature, culture, publication of original texts, history (ancient, medieval and contemporary) of the East, international relations and the economy of liberated countries.

Non-Alignment Movement: Some Conclusions and Prospects, by V. S. Kotlyarov

The article deals with the main trends of the non-alignment movement and its modifications. It demonstrates that notwithstanding the imperialist efforts to take advantage of different social and political systems of the member states, different approaches to some international issues, controversy and even conflicts, this movement has been progressing on the basis of anti-imperialism. It advocates complete decolonization, the reinforcement of the independence of Afro-Asian and Latin American countries, and opposes the neo-colonial exploitation of their material and human resources. The movement concentrates upon uniting non-aligned countries: It opposes nuclear war, the Israeli aggression in the Middle East, works for the removal of the hotbed of tension which is being created by American policy in the Indian Ocean, etc.

The article also analyzes the Seventh Conference of Non-Aligned States in Delhi. It is emphasized that this conference demonstrates that the movement enjoys great antiwar and anti-imperialist potential. The conference gave prominence to the discussion of the economic problems confronting the developing world and the establishment of a New International Economic Order. The adopted resolutions gave new stimuli to the struggle of progressive forces in developing countries, which stand for the prevention of war and against imperialism and colonialism.

State Planning in Africa, by S. A. Bessonov

The article summarizes the experience of planning in Africa over the past 20 years. Giving prominence to economic aspects, the article analyzes the

evolution of planning activity and singles out principal types of plans and programs both at the national and at the international levels. The multiplicity of various plans in terms of duration, orientation and nature, which are being drawn up in the bulk of African countries, gives rise to contradictions between states which impede their implementation and have an adverse effect on planning as a whole.

Having analyzed the major patterns, problems and obstacles related to the realization of various plans and programs, the article comes to the conclusion that planning in Africa is feasible only as a state activity. The short-term planning (2 to 3 years), as compared to long-term, is more sound economically. Today most of the African states are not in a position to regulate in any effective way the development of the public sector and the economy as a whole. Consequently, their respective plans are, at best, forecasts which, to top it all, seldom come true.

The article analyzes the potential and ways of raising the efficiency of economic planning in Africa. Notably, it recommends concentration on the plans and programs of state activity and the development of the public sector. Apart from this, to make planning a more realistic activity (in the private sector and the economy as a whole), certain socioeconomic reforms will be required to ensure more effective state control over private enterprise. It is also necessary to play down the spirit of laissez faire in the development of external economic relations of African states by means of planning and regulation to the benefit of the implementation of national plans and development programs.

On the Politization of Language in Some Eastern Countries, by L. B. Nikolsky

The article analyzes the factors which determine the politization of language and its conscious utilization for political purposes. As a means of intra-ethnic communication the language of an ethnic group is politically neutral. It serves all classes, strata, progressional and territorial groups of a given ethnos and is regarded as a natural and common asset.

Language undergoes politization in multinational capitalist countries and states of capitalist orientation due to the difference in the social and legal status of coexisting ethnic groups and the political domination of one ethnic group by another. This gives rise to and exacerbates linguistic contradictions which, from time to time, tend to assume the form of intrastate conflicts. Conflicts also arise when the policy of ruling circles creates favorable conditions for one ethnic group at the expense of others. Language becomes a political factor when used for sociopolitical purposes.

The article also examines the instances when language is used as a means of social mobilization, ethnic identification, to obtain economic advantages, for information selection and translation and as an instrument of struggle against an alien ethnic culture.

Forms of Peasant Exploitation in Medieval China, by A. S. Mugruzin

In medieval China state institutions played a structure-building role. State taxation systems determined the conditions of the existence of peasant land

holdings. The latter was of secondary importance as a rule. The emergence of this system is accounted for by the need for the utmost centralization of power due to the constant external threat of a nomadic invasion. This fact was also responsible for an uncompromising struggle Chinese absolutism waged against the feudalization of society in order to prevent the emergence of local units of power and influence.

Medieval China was characterized by the low productivity of agricultural labor. This impelled the central power to take drastic measures to maintain a monopoly over economic resources, i.e. to oppose the section of the ruling class which worked toward the uncontrolled expansion of its private land holdings. The state admitted the latter but tried to keep it within limits. Therefore private landholding could not serve as a basis for Chinese feudalism.

The existence of the system of state taxation and rent was dependent upon a power state apparatus which, along with ordinary administrative functions, looked after economic activities. The state had to compile a thorough cadastre in order to be aware of the economic potential of each household.

Considering bribery inevitable, the state kept the number of state officials at its lowest level. This gave rise to the institution of "semi-officials," who did not receive a salary. The rapid disintegration of this system was prevented by the existence of an effective central power and a widespread system of informers, which kept officials in fear of severe punishment.

Small-scale peasant landholding was the economic basis of the Chinese state system. The land legally belonged to the peasant, but economically it was owned by the state, for the latter extracted the entire surplus product. The state could extract the entire surplus product only from small-scale peasant holdings. The state was well aware of the fact that even when private landlord land holdings were taxed it was losing a portion of its income, which went to the landlord in the form of rent.

The system of state taxation and rent used to be a norm, a universal form of the surplus product, whereas the rent as such was an exception. In any case, it lacked stability. During the periods of state degradation the private landlord land holdings expanded and the rent (temporarily and "illegally") replaced the system of taxation.

Sages and Rulers, by T. P. Grigoryeva

The article deals with the sayings of sages and the way they were perceived by rulers. It examines the changes the ancient Chinese doctrines underwent in the social and cultural context of Japan, how the functions of doctrines diverged from their essence under the influence of the idea of the divine origin of the emperor and the Japanese people, the indisputable confrontation of the "up and down," which contradicted the initial understanding of the way (tao) as the changeability and reversability of yin and yang.

It is this regard that the article treats categories of ancient Chinese doctrines, such as he (Japanese wa), li and their initial meaning and interpretations by Japanese rulers and philosophers, which were largely dependent

upon social attitudes, the nature of historical development and philosophical tenets.

The article suggests that the Japanese (in contrast to Indians or Chinese) are more prone to a dichotomical structure which could not but have an effect on social relations and historical rhythms. This structure, to some extent, conditioned the dynamics of the social development of Japan, its accelerated modernization during the Meiji period.

The article notes that traditional Japanese art necessarily plays the role of a consolidating factor in Japanese reality. This fact accounts for its "non-dual" nature which allows us to put within the same brackets the phenomena of Japanese art with those of life. Today this non-duality and integrity draw attention to Japanese art.

Literary and Scientific Activity of Zaheeraddin Muhammad Babur, by I. V. Stebleva

The article deals with the literary activity of Babur, who created his works in all the main genres of classic Turkic-language poetry of Central Asia and at the same time was a gifted prose writer. The article demonstrates that the poetry of Babur, distinguished by superb technique and simple style, was an expression of his genuine sentiments and emotions. The comparison of Babur's poetry with his prose, namely his memoirs "Babur-Name," is evidence of this.

The literary activity of Babur runs parallel to his academic activity, which resulted in the "Tract Concerning Aruz." This tract examines the way the rules of Arab and Persian poetry writing were realized in the Turkic-language milieu. In other words, Babur showed the specific features of "aruz." The contribution of Babur to the development of the Turkish culture is so immense that it calls for continued comprehensive analysis.

The Material Culture and Economy of Peoples of Western Indonesia in Pre-Written Period, by S. V. Kullanda

The process of state genesis in Western Indonesia cannot be traced by means of the study of local written tradition which dates back to a later period. Therefore the author examines mainly the data of comparative linguistics (supported whenever possible by archaeological evidence).

The distinguishing of three chronological levels of linguistic reconstruction, referred to as Proto-Austronesian (reconstructions based both on Indonesian/Philippine and Oceanian cognates), Western Austronesian (reconstructions based both on Indonesian and Philippine cognates) and West Indonesian (reconstructions based only on West Indonesian cognates), allows for the investigation of the development of the Indonesian (resp. Austronesian) society throughout the pre-written period.

According to linguistic data, toward the end of the discussed period (2d-1st centuries B.C.), the population of Western Indonesia cultivated rice and other crops on irrigated (by directing water conserved in dams through pipes and

canals) and dry (rarely) fields. They were also skilled sailors. Among crafts, shipbuilding, metallurgy and weaving are noteworthy. There have been regular "home" (within the archipelago) and overseas trade. Wars were regularly waged. Different kinds of offensive and defensive arms (swords, spears, helmets and armor) were used and fortified settlements were built. Social relations and spiritual life were also fairly well developed.

The description of the ancient West Indonesian economy, though an imperfect and hypothetical one, may be regarded as based on local (and to some extent synchronous with the process in question) sources.

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Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 83 p 219

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PRIMAKOV ON ORIENTALISTS' TASKS, NEED FOR SCHOLARLY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH

[Editorial report] Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, September-October 1983 publishes on pages 3-15 a 10 000-word article entitled "The Tasks Facing Soviet Oriental Studies" by Ye. M. Primakov, chairman of the All-Union Orientalists' Association and director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute. The article is described in a footnote as "based on [Primakov's] report to the Second All-Union Orientalists' Conference in Baku in May 1983." There are no significant differences between the two items. For the text of Primakov's report to the Orientalists' Conference, as published in Baku VYSHKA in Russian on 26 May 1983, see the USSR Report: Political and Sociological Affairs No 1452, JPRS 84225, 30 August 1983, pages 41-53.

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IDEA OF NONALIGNED 'EQUIDISTANCE,' 'THIRD WAY' BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS HIT

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 83 pp 16-23

[Article by V. S. Kotlyarov: "The Movement for Nonalignment--Some Results and Prospects"]

[Text] The seventh conference of the heads of state and government of non-aligned countries in March 1983 in New Delhi cogently demonstrated the magnitude of the role this movement is playing in the resolution of the major political and economic problems of our day and in the consolidation of peace and international security.

Under the present conditions of dangerous development in world events, the governments of peaceful states are insisting that aggressive imperialist forces be curbed. They are striving to prevent the dramatic escalation of the arms race, the imperialists' attempts to attain military superiority, their efforts to exacerbate crises in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions and all other actions threatening to put the world on the verge of nuclear catastrophe. The countries supporting peace and detente include the states which united in the movement for nonalignment more than two decades ago. In their first declaration they solemnly announced that "no state and no government can avoid responsibility for keeping the peace throughout the world, ...that war between peoples is not only an anachronism but also a crime against mankind, ...that the principles of peaceful coexistence are the only alternative to 'cold war' and a possible worldwide nuclear catastrophe."¹

The years that have gone by since these young states entered the world arena have clearly indicated the beneficial effects of their demands for peace, equality and socioeconomic progress and their influence on the balance of power between the two opposing social systems. The nonaligned countries came into being in an atmosphere of confrontation between the two systems and resolved to pursue an independent international policy. Its chief tendency was the common desire of the newly liberated states to play an active role in international affairs as an independent political force and fight for complete independence and equality in the resolution of the main problems of our day.

In the political respect, the nonaligned countries as a group have become a major world force. The movement grows in size and strength from year to year. In the past few years alone the movement was joined by around 15

socialist and non-socialist states, including some which shook off the bloc fetters of imperialism just recently. Several socialist countries are full members of the movement--Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Yugoslavia and the DPRK. Over 100 states were represented at the New Delhi meeting of the heads of state and government of the nonaligned countries.² During the years of the movement's existence, its membership has quadrupled. Nonaligned countries now control around two-thirds of the votes at General Assembly sessions and are represented much more broadly in the Security Council and other important UN bodies. This proves that peaceful policy has ceased to be the monopoly of a few powers.

The movement's members excluded the fascist junta ruling Chile from their ranks and expelled first the pro-American Lon Nol regime in Kampuchea and then the anti-people clique of Pol Pot, who was pursuing a policy of genocide against his own people on an unprecedented scale. The nonaligned countries have continued to refuse membership to the puppet regime in South Korea. Under outside pressure, however, Burma, a country which was in the movement from the beginning and consistently supported its principles and goals for many years, departed from its declared policy of "total nonalignment" (although it is still a member of the movement).

The movement for nonalignment has made a perceptible contribution to the resolution of numerous complex problems in contemporary international affairs and has invariably fought against war and imperialism. "Its strength lies in its opposition to imperialism and colonialism, to war and aggression.... The key to the further augmentation of the nonaligned movement's role in world politics...can be found in its loyalty to its fundamental principles," the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress said.³

The nonaligned countries pursue one type of foreign policy line. On the one hand, this is due to the common past of the former colonies and dependent countries and their struggle to strengthen their political independence and to attain economic independence. One distinctive feature of this line is joint action against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and apartheid and for the establishment of a new international economic order on a fair and equitable basis. On the other hand, the policy of nonalignment is distinguished by the establishment and development of relations of a new type with the socialist world on the basis of equality, mutual advantage and a desire for social progress. The socialist countries are known to have offered maximum support to people fighting for their national and social liberation--both during the era of the anticolonial revolutions and during the current stage of the liberation struggle. "Solidarity with states which have freed themselves from colonial oppression and with peoples who are defending their independence," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov stressed, "has been and will continue to be one of the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy."⁴

Within the context of this essentially identical foreign policy line, there are--and this is significant--various foreign policy concepts which influence the sociopolitical orientation of nonaligned countries, their view of various

international issues and their approach to these issues. In recent years members of the movement have mainly discussed three concepts: "Equidistance," "natural allies" and the "third force"; they will be of fundamental importance in the future development of the movement. The movement's members have also discussed other concepts, such as the "tricontinentalism" of nonalignment, which raises the issue of the movement's geographic limits, particularly with regard to the permissibility of participation in the movement by European countries pursuing a policy of neutrality.

As for the concept of "equidistance," it is now being criticized vehemently even within the movement. The supporters of this concept allege that the fundamental principles of nonalignment must be "equidistant" from capitalism and from socialism, implying a refusal to participate in any kind of military alliance. In this connection it is significant that neither the world socialist community nor the Soviet Union has ever, in contrast to the West, and especially the United States, forced the newly liberated countries to participate in any kind of "militaristic blocs." Washington and its allies have adhered to a different line. Now that the system of aggressive blocs and alliances they created in the 1950's in the liberation struggle zone has collapsed, they are feverishly trying to put new military alliances together and involve the nonaligned countries in them.

The majority of prominent politicians and public spokesmen in the nonaligned countries have a negative view of the concept of "equidistance." "There is nothing more dangerous and hypocritical for nonalignment," Professor R. Khan, administrator of the Nehru University Center for Political Studies and former member of the Indian Parliament, remarked, "than agreement with this theory." It is impossible to equate two powers, he went on to say, when one is "friendly toward nonalignment" and the other "calls it amoral." Nonalignment signifies the refusal of states to enter into any kind of bloc for military purposes. It does not, however, prohibit states from entering alliances pursuing peaceful goals, in the interests of the development of these states. A classic example of this, R. Khan stressed, is the treaty on peace, friendship and cooperation signed by the USSR and India in 1971. This document provides irrefutable proof that India has not departed from the policy of nonalignment in the past 10 years, and that the Soviet Union is not trying to influence Indian foreign policy. This treaty has played a tremendous role in the attainment of Indian national goals.⁵

As for the concept of "natural allies," its supporters are known to regard the movement as an anti-imperialist and anticolonial force and therefore believe that all countries pursuing an anti-imperialist policy and opposing colonialism and neocolonialism, especially the countries of the socialist community, are the allies of the nonaligned states, and "natural" allies at that. This idea, which has won increasing recognition in many nonaligned states, has evoked frenzied attacks from imperialist circles and the enemies of the nonaligned movement. During discussions of the concept of "natural allies," influential members of this movement often call for a "return to the original principles of nonalignment." The words of one of the movement's founders, Gamal Abdel Nasser, are significant in this context: "The national revolutionary movement of the Asian and African people against imperialism

and underdevelopment, which is a characteristic feature of the present era, particularly during the remarkable period after the end of World War II, owes many of its victories to the existence and strength of the Soviet Union, which has become a tangible factor in the restraint of imperialism and the creation of exceptionally favorable opportunities for national revolutionary forces to play an effective role in the struggle for independence and progress on the broadest possible scale."⁶

The allegation that "one superpower" is trying to draw the movement for non-alignment over to its own side and turn it into the "drive belt" of its own policy certainly sounds amazing in this context. It is possible to agree or disagree with the concept of the "natural ally," but this interpretation of the matter is contrary to the truth and represents a distortion or denial of the contribution world socialism has made to the national liberation struggle. When Nigerian President S. Shagari was asked in an interview why the non-aligned countries "are more patient" with the Soviet Union than with Western countries, he stressed that "the majority of nonaligned countries were victims of Western imperialism. In today's Africa we are most disturbed by the apartheid in South Africa, colonialism in Namibia and neocolonialism. We know that all of these evils are supported and encouraged not by the Soviet Union, but by the West. If it appears that we are undiscerning in our relations with the USSR, the reason is that it supports us in matters to which we attach great significance."⁷

G. Nehru's words about the place of the concept of nonalignment in the contemporary struggle must also be recalled in this connection: "If human freedom or peace are endangered, we cannot and will not remain neutral; neutrality in this case would signify a betrayal of all the things for which we fought and all that we are now defending."⁸ In response to the question of whether the socialist countries are the natural allies of the movement for nonalignment, T. N. Kaul, prominent Indian public spokesman, wrote: "This matter must be settled once and for all, as it is exceptionally important for the unity and successful activity of the movement in the future. Although from the military standpoint the nonaligned states do not belong to the blocs of the great powers, from the political standpoint they should welcome the support of any camp or country if it contributes to the struggle against colonialism, imperialism and racism."⁹

The supporters of the third of these concepts have endowed it with ideas and beliefs reflecting elements of traditional thinking; sometimes their remarks display symptoms of Asia-centrism, pan-Africanism, the ideas of Latin American exclusivity, etc. They insist that the movement for nonalignment should make a greater effort to create some kind of "third force" in the world. An appeal which once appeared in a Tanzanian newspaper, for example, is indicative in this respect: "Small nations, unite! You have nothing to lose but your poverty."¹⁰ Although the very course of world events in the years since this appeal was made told the nonaligned countries which forces in the world are promoting the liberation movement and which are impeding it, the proponents of the "third way" still have some influence in the developing countries.

In the most general terms, these concepts reflect different "national varieties" of the policy of nonalignment. The political, economic and social

heterogeneity of the nonaligned states, however, has not prevented their positive and, with rare exceptions, unanimous decisions on complex international issues of the present day in the interest of peace, detente and co-operation. Although the integration of national liberation forces on a general democratic basis and the principles of nonalignment has been accompanied by a broader spectrum of foreign policy views within the movement's ranks and although the determination of government circles in various non-aligned countries to confront imperialism varies in degree, these are not insurmountable obstacles on the way to their common goals. The young states united in the movement for nonalignment have, for example, supported the victims of aggressive imperialist wars in the Middle East and Indochina, resolutely exposed the West's conspiracy with the racist regime in South Africa and are adhering firmly to a policy of solidarity with the struggle of people who are still suffering under imperialism's colonial yoke.

In the last 2 years alone, the nonaligned countries held several special sessions of the foreign ministers' coordinating bureau to discuss Namibia (in Algeria), the Palestinian question (Kuwait), the situation in Lebanon (Cyprus) and conditions in Latin America (Nicaragua). The final documents of these sessions clearly indicate the actual source of the current threat to peace and the dangerous implications of American imperialism's aggressive policy line. The members of the movement have not only coordinated their actions and views for the purpose of quick and appropriate reactions to the intrigues of the enemies of peace--this has been reflected in published statements--but have also taken a number of political actions with a view to the actual balance of power in the world. Regarding the United Nations as the most important sphere of their joint activity, they obtained Nicaragua's inclusion in the Security Council in cooperation with the countries of the world socialist system and against the wishes of imperialist forces, especially the United States, exposed Washington's misuse of its veto powers and unanimously supported the resolution condemning aggressive Israel and its patron, the United States. The resolution on Lebanon proposed by the nonaligned and socialist states at the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly (October 1982) was supported by 147 votes; only two states voted against the resolution--the United States and Israel.

During the process of sometimes severe disagreements and heated debates, the nonaligned countries have always reached a consensus and found compromises when the discussion has turned to joint opposition to imperialist actions aimed at creating internal instability within the movement, sowing the seeds of discord and enmity, weakening and undermining the unity of its members by deliberately dividing them into "moderate," "conservative" and "radical" groups, etc. In recent years the enemies of the movement for nonalignment have taken several such actions. They have tried to destabilize the situation in the nonaligned countries by creating artificial economic and political difficulties, preventing joint anti-imperialist actions by young national states and alienating members of the movement from their allies, from progressive forces and, above all, from the socialist countries.

The growing international prestige of the movement for nonalignment has compelled the chief imperialist powers to modify their opinions, at least verbally, of the movement and give up their previous ideas, which are largely

ineffective against the movement's present methods and means of opposition. Outright attacks and vulgar insults, such as those which were once resorted to by J. F. Dulles, who is known to have called the movement for nonalignment "amoral," are no longer possible in our day. Western leaders have recognized the movement as a "new center of power" and are seeking a new approach to the movement, "mutual understanding" and "friendly" relations. Just before the beginning of the forum in New Delhi, R. Reagan, M. Thatcher and H. Kohl sent goodwill messages to the nonaligned conference. Whereas the West European powers have adhered to tactics based on the methods of economic neocolonialism in line with their integrated interests, the United States has continued to utilize and even to emphasize the exertion of pressure by military force, combining this with a policy of flirtation with the nonaligned countries. The American press, which was just recently using various insulting phrases to describe these countries, such as the "tyrannical majority," the "band of beggars" and the "source of tension and chaos in the world," is now trying to modulate its tone and is advising the nonaligned countries to give up "radical rhetorics" and rigid "anti-Western positions," "adhere to a more equidistant line" and "pursue a policy of genuine nonalignment."

Aggressive imperialist circles are directing their efforts primarily against the particular nonaligned states which have been most consistent in their pursuit of independent development. The West has launched a campaign of lies and slander against Cuba, which has not only headed the movement successfully for three and a half years, but has also made an important contribution to the implementation of its anti-imperialist principles and goals and has aided several African, Asian and Latin American states in their struggle against imperialism. This hostile campaign has received the condemnation it warrants in official circles of the movement and in the press of the developing countries. "Cuba and its outstanding leader Fidel Castro," remarked, for example, D. R. Goal, editor-in-chief of the New Delhi Journal SECULAR DEMOCRACY, "has always had a beneficial effect on the movement for nonalignment, clarifying its objectives and defining its role in contemporary politics. Its voice is being heard by more and more people and its influence has been felt more and more when decisions are made on the future of the movement."¹¹ The activity of Cuba and Fidel Castro was commended highly in the documents of the seventh conference of nonaligned countries in New Delhi, in the speech by the present chairman of the movement, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India, and in reports by many other speakers. All of this testifies to the groundlessness of the hopes that the movement will be undermined and that the nonaligned countries' efforts to defend the unity of their ranks on an anti-imperialist basis will grow weaker.

Just before the conference in New Delhi and during the conference, enemies of nonalignment tried to dull its anti-imperialist thrust, to divert the attention of the movement's members from cardinal issues of common interest and to promote the discussion of artificially created issues on which the nonaligned countries hold differing views. Several months before the conference the conservative press in a number of ASEAN countries campaigned for the invitation of Norodom Sihanouk to the summit-meeting in New Delhi as a "representative" of Kampuchea, although this "prince without subjects" has not been in that country for over 13 years. This campaign was actively supported by the

Western press, especially the U.S. media; pressure was exerted on the country organizing the conference and attempts were made to prevent dialogue between the countries of Indochina and ASEAN and to escalate tension in Southeast Asia.

India took a clear and precise stand on this matter. Its government resolutely reaffirmed the diplomatic recognition of the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, headed by Heng Samrin, and refused to take action against this decision.¹² The attempt to have Kampuchea represented by members of the "coalition government," to fill a place defined as a "vacancy" at a previous conference in Havana, was frustrated by the active and flexible diplomacy of the Indochinese countries. To avoid splitting the movement and diverting the conference from the discussion of fundamental aspects of the anti-imperialist struggle, the Kampuchean Government did not demand a conference seat. A day before the summit conference began, the foreign ministers of the nonaligned countries agreed that the Kampuchean issue would not be on the agenda of the meeting of heads of state and government.

The attempts of imperialist and reactionary forces to use the "Afghan question" against the movement also failed. The constant peace initiatives of the DRA Government and the resulting series of bilateral meetings on various levels with Pakistani officials, actively mediated by a representative of the UN Secretary General, convinced the heads of state and government of the nonaligned countries of Afghanistan's real intentions. The Afghan Government's purposeful search for ways of negotiating a peace, meeting the requirements of earlier decisions of the nonaligned countries, won approval and support at the conference. Of course, this issue is still quite complex and still requires considerable effort for its resolution. The nonaligned countries have, however, invariably favored its peaceful resolutions.

The solidarity and support of the Soviet Union and other socialist states have had a beneficial effect on the strength of the movement, its prestige in the world arena and the development of positive processes within the movement.

Interrelations between the movement and these states have become an important part of the total structure of contemporary international relations and a substantial contribution to the reduction of the danger of war, the consolidation of peace and public security and the reinforcement of detente. The Soviet Union has persistently and consistently supported national liberation movements, has resolutely repulsed aggressive imperialist intrigues and has taken determined steps to eradicate racism and apartheid. The USSR and other countries of the socialist community have taken the side of the independent states and the movement for nonalignment against the policy of apartheid, against Pretoria's plans to perpetuate its domination of Namibia and against the racist regime's continued armed attacks on neighboring countries. "We place a particularly high value on the assistance of the socialist states, especially the Soviet Union,"¹³ declared S. Nujoma, president of SWAPO, the patriotic organization recognized by the world community as the only legal representative of the Namibian people and a member of the movement for non-alignment for several years.

The Soviet Union's support and solidarity have a principled basis on which the formation of political relations of a new type takes place; they are reflected in a concentrated form in the treaties on friendship and cooperation between the USSR and nonaligned states. All of these treaties--and more than ten have been signed--are permeated with the profound interest of both sides in the guaranteed peace and security of people in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the rest of the world. By the beginning of 1983 the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with 96 newly liberated countries and had concluded agreements on economic, scientific and technical cooperation with 65 of them. The CEMA countries combined have concluded such agreements with more than 100 young states.

"The efforts of the nonaligned movement in the struggle for peace and public security, for the cessation of the arms race, for disarmament, for the reconstruction of international economic relations on a just and democratic basis and for total and complete decolonization have always been fervently supported in the Soviet Union," the message from the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers to Chairman I. Gandhi of the New Delhi conference of the heads of state and government of the nonaligned countries said. "The nonaligned countries can always count on the goodwill and cooperation of the Soviet Union in the attainment of their just desires," the message stressed.¹⁴

The New Delhi summit meeting was a new and important step in the history of the nonaligned movement. It proved that the movement had not grown weaker in the three and a half years since the last meeting in Havana, despite all of the intrigues of imperialism and its minions, that it had, as F. Castro said in his report at the conference, grown more energetic and that its independence had been guarded against all infringements. Many conference speakers voiced support for the recent peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The main result of the conference was the coordination of the nonaligned states' positions on major aspects of the movement's strategy and tactics. These positions were recorded in conference documents--political and economic declarations and the "New Delhi appeal." The non-aligned countries have said that the slide toward nuclear conflict must be stopped and have called upon the nuclear powers to take immediate measures to prevent this conflict and to negotiate a ban on the use, further production and deployment of weapons of mass destruction. The conference resolutely declared its support of the national liberation movement for the complete eradication of colonialism and racism. A special conference resolution states that the nonaligned countries firmly believe that Namibia should be independent, that the racist regime in South Africa should be dissolved and that the Palestinian Arabs should exercise their inalienable rights, including the right to create their own independent state.

It is noteworthy that many of the statements made in New Delhi essentially coincide with the specific proposals made by socialist countries for the purpose of normalizing international affairs and eliminating the danger of a world war. The conference unequivocally rejected the American concept of "limited" nuclear war and the policy of "nuclear deterrence," condemned the Western powers' deployment of nuclear weapons in various parts of the world

and the West's cooperation with Israel and South Africa in the sphere of nuclear weapons, and advocated the creation of nuclear-free zones in various regions. All of this proved once again that the international interests of the nonaligned countries are identical or similar to the interests of the socialist world, that they have a common objective basis and that they are fundamentally incompatible with the policy of imperialism by virtue of objective natural laws. Problems connected with the Indian Ocean occupied an important place in the debates and in the final documents of the conference; a declaration demands the return of the illegally seized Chagos Archipelago, including the island of Diego Garcia, to the state of Mauritius, the resumption of Soviet-American talks on the Indian Ocean and the transformation of this ocean into a zone of peace.

The conference resolutely rejected the imperialist policy of establishing new military bases and new "military structures of great powers" (a reference to the American Centcom). The most urgent economic problems of the newly liberated countries were the subject of detailed and thorough discussion. The discussion took place in an atmosphere of total unanimity. Conference speakers stressed the importance of the struggle to eradicate inequities and injustices in the system of international economic relations and to establish a new international economic order as an integral part of the struggle for political and social liberation, and pointedly condemned imperialist neo-colonial policy in this connection and the attempts of the West, especially the United States, to sabotage the UN decision with regard to the global talks on cardinal problems in international economic relations. The conference noted that the movement for nonalignment firmly supports the right of each people to control their own natural resources, pursue an independent economic policy and have an equal vote in international credit and finance organizations. "There can be no genuine peace and security," said Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid, for example, in his speech at the plenary session, "until the exploitation of the Third World has ceased."¹⁵ Conference participants supported India's proposal on the need to take action in three directions in economic strategy: Firstly, to continue promoting global talks on the radical reorganization of international economic relations; secondly, without waiting for these talks to begin, to implement a program of immediate measures, including the facilitation of the repayment of debts, the lowering of barriers limiting the access of goods to the markets of industrial countries, the mobilization of funds for the development of agriculture and power engineering, etc.; finally and thirdly, to institute the principles of collective self-reliance on a broader scale and to promote more active cooperation by the developing countries themselves.

The results of the conference pleased the world community. Its constructive decisions will make a perceptible contribution to the improvement of the international situation.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Dvizheniye neprisoedineniya v dokumentakh i materialakh" [Documents and Papers of the Nonaligned Movement], Moscow, 1979, p 53.

2. The movement accepted four new members at the conference in New Delhi: the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Barbados, Colombia and the Republic of Vanuatu.
3. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 15.
4. PRAVDA, 23 November 1982.
5. R. Khan, "Non-Alignment Context, Dimensions and Challenges," in "Perspectives on Non-Alignment," edited by Khan, New Delhi, 1981, p 36.
6. "SSSR i s"trany Afriki. 1946-1962 gg." [The USSR and the African Countries. 1946-1962], Vol 2, Moscow, 1963, p 627.
7. AFRICA NOW, November 1982.
8. Quoted in: S. N. Dhar, "Nehru on Non-Alignment," INDIA AND FOREIGN REVIEW, New Delhi, 15 June 1964, p 34.
9. T. N. Kaul, "Non-Alignment: Retrospect and Perspective," in "Perspectives on Non-Alignment," New Delhi, 1979, pp 56-58.
10. STANDART, Dar es Salaam, 14 April 1970.
11. D. R. Goal, "Cuba's Role in the Movements of Non-Alignment," in "Perspectives on Non-Alignment," New Delhi, 1980, pp 239-250.
12. THE HINDUSTAN TIMES, 15 January 1983.
13. PRAVDA, 21 April 1981.
14. Ibid., 7 March 1983.
15. Ibid., 11 March 1983.

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SHORTCOMINGS IN GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC PLANNING IN AFRICA DISCUSSED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 83 pp 24-32

[Article by S. A. Bessonov: "State Planning in Africa"]

[Text] Virtually all of the African states, regardless of their sociopolitical orientation, are now drawing up various plans and programs.¹ Definite efforts are also being made to carry them out. The majority of plans and programs are economic, but the African governments are also paying increasing attention to the planned regulation of major social processes in accordance with their sociopolitical nature. How realistic and effective are all of these efforts to plan and, consequently, to manage social development? We will try to examine this matter, using economic planning as an example, in the hope that our basic observations will be of value in the assessment of planning in the social and political spheres. In view of the limited length of this article, we will not try to discuss the specific content of state plans and programs.²

There are many similar features in the planning practices of all African states. This is the result of the common basic trends in their economic development and the common problems and difficulties they are encountering. Nevertheless, specific factors, primarily the social-class nature of each state, also leave a strong imprint on the scales, the nature and the very content of these plans. This is why countries with a socialist and capitalist orientation display the greatest differences in planning practices. The basic content of the plans and programs drawn up by African governments consists of measures to implement a development strategy and development tactics. The longer the duration of the plan period and the broader the range of problems it covers, the more prominent strategic aspects will be; the shorter the plan period and the more limited its sphere of application, the more specific the goals and the methods of their attainment will be. State planning first appeared in Africa on the national level, but the development of intergovernmental cooperation on the continent has led to the development of intergovernmental planning as well.

National planning exists in two principal forms: planning for development and planning for the stabilization of this development. In addition to "general" (or "all-encompassing") national plans, which are supposed, at least officially, to cover the entire societal process, "particular" programs are also drawn up to deal with a particular sphere (or area) of this process. By the

beginning of the 1980's the majority of African countries had short- or medium-range (that is, for 3 to 6 years) "general" national development plans; they also have various "particular" programs. In Zambia, for example, the third national development plan (1979-1983) is coming to an end, but there is also a 10-year program of national food self-sufficiency which was adopted when this plan was already in effect and is designed for the 1980-1990 period. In 19 African countries all of the state planning is still "particular," essentially encompassing only the state sector. This is true of the 5-year plans of Malawi (1981/82-1985/86) and Somalia (1982-1986) and the 3-year plan in Gabon (1980-1982).

Since the middle of the 1970's, short-range (1 or 2 years) programs of economic stabilization have been drawn up in many African countries in connection with the deterioration of the general conditions of development, rising inflation, unemployment and other consequences of the severe economic crisis in the capitalist countries and the dramatic rise in world oil prices. The primary purpose of these programs is the alleviation, if not the complete elimination, of the disparities resulting from inflationary economic growth, especially those between domestic and foreign revenues and expenditures, most of them budgetary in nature. These programs mainly consist of government measures to reduce spending in the country (including capital investments) and stimulate accumulations and revenues (primarily from exports). These stabilization programs have generally been drawn up with the aid of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has taken on some of the cost of crediting the country's foreign payments but has also dictated basic guidelines of domestic and foreign economic policy to governments. At least half of the African states had economic stabilization programs in 1980-1982, and many of them had several. In Zaire, for example, four stabilization programs were drawn up in the past 7 years, with the last of these programs covering the period from May 1980 through December 1981. These programs often make their appearance while national development plans are still in effect. In Senegal the first stabilization program (1980) coincided with the end of the fifth 4-year plan (1977-1980), and the second of these programs (1981) coincided with the beginning of the sixth (1981-1984).

The subjects of intergovernmental planning are two or more cooperating states, and its object is the sphere of their cooperation. An important role in the spread of this kind of planning was played by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the Organization of African Unit (OAU). In particular, they initiated several continental (excluding South Africa) development plans; the most important are the African (Monrovia) Development Strategy for the 1980's and the Lagos Plan of Action for the implementation of this strategy.³ The main function of these plans is to determine the major guidelines of continental development and to serve as a basis for the compilation of national plans. The end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's were also marked by more vigorous planning activity within the framework of regional economic groups. Programs for cooperation in transportation, communications, power engineering, agriculture, foreign trade and other fields were drawn up in several of them, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).⁴ But the most prevalent type of intergovernmental plan is the

bilateral program for economic cooperation. These programs were drawn up from the very beginning when agreements were concluded on economic matters between African and socialist countries; now these plans are also being compiled during negotiations with capitalist powers.

The states with a socialist orientation are making the most vigorous effort to use planning, regarding it as the main instrument of socialist construction. It is not surprising that the planning experience in Algeria has been among the most productive and educative experiments in the developing world. Following a 3-year (1967-1969) and two 4-year plans (1970/71-1977/78), a 5-year plan for 1980-1984 is now being carried out in Algeria. Regimes which rely on the spontaneous, "natural" workings of capitalist evolution for the development of their countries are paying much less attention to planning.

State planning practices reflect the sociopolitical and economic instability characteristic of many countries of this continent. Governments often have to give up general national plans in favor of short-range development plans and stabilization programs. Periods of internal strife, intervention and so forth essentially wreck economic planning. This has been going on for many years, for example, in Chad. Instability also leads to the repeated revision of national plans, and even to their cancellation, sometimes officially but more often de facto. Each change of government or significant change in government strategy is accompanied by the cancellation of earlier plans. For example, the reactionary coup in Ghana (1965) stopped all of the work on the 7-year plan for 1963/64-1969/70, and the Sudan's departure from a socialist orientation in 1972 disrupted the 5-year plan for 1971-1975. Virtually all of the national plans in developing Africa have undergone changes, and around one-third have failed for various reasons to "reach their allotted life span." In the Arab Republic of Egypt, for example, only one of the eight national plans drawn up over a period of 20 years (1960-1980) stayed in effect as planned--the first 5-year plan for 1960/61-1964/65. Quite often plans are changed without any formal revision, but simply through annual plans and development budgets.

The compilation of state plans and programs of varying duration, content and purpose, which often coincide or even "overlap"--that is, apply (either completely or partially) to the same economic sectors or social spheres--gives rise to questions about the connection between these plans and programs. National planning agencies strive in principle to connect and coordinate all plans and programs in such a way that partial and short-range plans serve as a clarification and development of more general and long-range plans. In practice, however, this is rarely possible. An analysis of the contents of various planning documents indicates, in particular, that later plans--particularly short-range and specific ones--are actually independent of earlier long-range and general plans and are frequently absolutely inconsistent with their strategic aims. There are vast differences between development plans and programs on the one hand and stabilization programs on the other. In essence, they have conflicting purposes: The first are aimed at the maximum acceleration of economic growth (which generally leads eventually to the growth of economic disparities and inflation), while the latter are aimed at the limitation of this growth and even its deceleration by means of the reduction of all spending, particularly government spending, including

capital investments. All governments, furthermore, want their intergovernmental programs to supplement national development plans and serve as an instrument of their implementation. Only bilateral agreements on cooperation with socialist countries, however, make this fully possible. Other programs are often compiled without this kind of coordination. Some of their sections are either automatically included in the national plans of partner countries or exist separately from them. This is particularly true of the economic cooperation programs of regional groups.

Analyses of the implementation of state plans and programs in the developing countries of Africa are severely complicated by the absence of the necessary information. Governments are usually quite stingy with information about the fulfillment of their plans and programs, and some simply do not divulge information of this kind. In the case of many aspects of societal development, full statistics are either lacking or are published after long delays. Many conclusions are based on indirect estimates; some of the existing information is inconsistent with plan indicators, etc. Nevertheless, some statements can be made about the implementation of these plans and programs. There is every indication that the implementation of these plans and programs has been far from complete, particularly in the case of "all-compassing" development plans, especially the long-range ones. Short-range, specific plans and programs are generally carried out more fully. State economic planning appears much more effective if it is examined over a series of plan periods rather than within the context of separate periods: Many of the projects which are not completed by their original deadline are usually completed in subsequent programs.

In essence, the entire state sector of the economy in the African countries is the result of planned activities. Large modern enterprises--metallurgical plants, petrochemical complexes and so forth--could not exist without state-wide planning. The most realistic plans are all of the various types of emergency programs, although the stabilization programs are a definite exception to this rule. Their goals (the eradication or considerable reduction of budget and foreign payment deficits, the reduction of inflation, etc.) are usually attained, but not in full. In fact, all of the disparities in these countries stem from the natural loss of reproduction in the world capitalist system--its spontaneous and anarchic development, the dependent status of the former colonies, their continued plundering by transnational corporations, etc.--which the developing countries are still not capable of changing.

Programs of government activity are not carried out in full either. State investments are often lower than projected figures. The deterioration of economic and political conditions in a country is accompanied by a lower percentage of plan fulfillment. At the end of the 1970's plans for that decade in the majority of African countries had been fulfilled by 50-60 percent, and the figure was even lower in some cases.⁵ The most important and most prevalent reason for the failure of actual capital investments to keep up with planned figures is the shortage of financial resources. This applies to domestic and foreign resources. Disparities are particularly evident in state investment programs drawn up during periods of favorable

economic conditions with the hope of their stabilization. In fact, however, economic conditions deteriorated dramatically in the second half of the 1970's, and the export prices of many of the raw materials exported by developing countries began to drop under the influence of the world capitalist prices; consequently, budget revenues decreased. Falling prices disrupted development programs in Morocco (the price of phosphates), Liberia (iron ore), Zaire and Zambia (copper), and in the last 2 years lower oil revenues disrupted these programs in Algeria and Nigeria. Capital investments in the Nigerian federal budget for 1981 were 12 percent lower than in 1980 and 37 percent lower than the average annual level stipulated in the 5-year plan for 1981-1985.⁶

Other common causes of the reduction of planned state capital investments were increased sociopolitical tension in these countries, their involvement in armed conflicts, etc. All of this tends to divert already meager budget resources to military-political goals and limits opportunities for foreign economic assistance (or sometimes puts a stop to it). Projects are postponed indefinitely and government economic programs remain on paper to one degree or another. This is what happens, for example, in Somalia at the time of its aggressive actions in Ogaden in 1978-1979, in Chad during the internal battles of 1979-1982, etc.

Another important reason for the non-fulfillment of many government investment programs is the transfer to a policy of economic stabilization. As mentioned above, this takes the form of deliberate cuts in government spending. Stabilization programs essentially lead to the cancellation of earlier plans or at least to the postponement of many projects. In Togo, for example, the government's capital budget was reduced from 15.83 billion African francs in 1979 to 7.4 billion in 1980 and 3.99 billion in 1981 for this reason.⁷

The financing of government capital investments has been a less pressing problem for the countries exporting some kind of raw material with favorable world prices during the period in question (for example, the African exporters of oil during 1973-1979). Nevertheless, even here investment programs have often been underfulfilled in real terms (even in the case of nominal overfulfillment), because far from all of the projects included in them have been completed on schedule. For example, many of the projects in the Libyan 5-year plan for 1976-1980, with a total cost of 3-4 billion Libyan dinars, were carried over to the next 5-year period.⁸ This was due primarily to organizational and technical factors--unsatisfactory preparations for projects, the shortage of the necessary manpower, etc. Annual budget allocations for development purposes in Libya were utilized only by 75-80 percent in the 1970's for precisely these reasons.⁹ The differences between nominal and real capital investments are usually the result of a rise in the actual cost of projects in comparison to planning calculations. During the period of the abovementioned Libyan plan, for example, the cost of the projects included in this plan rose by more than 25 percent just as a result of the rising world prices of equipment.¹⁰ In addition to this, many projects (including non-economic government projects requiring financial, material and other resources) are now being carried out everywhere although they were not envisaged in long-range development plans and programs but appeared only later in short-range programs.

As for development plans and programs pertaining to the private sector, their comparison to the actual state of affairs indicates a broad range of conclusions. Disparities, both in the direction of overfulfillment and in the direction of underfulfillment, are so sizable that the existence of any clear cause and effect relationship between the plans and the actual state of affairs is dubious. Experience tells us that the development of the private sector of the economy and, consequently, of the economy in general is influenced by various factors, among which state planning and all of the activity of national governments represent only one factor, and not even the most influential one; the influence of the spontaneous workings of the natural laws of the world capitalist economy is most perceptible everywhere. Under the favorable economic conditions of the past, some of the indicators in national plans and programs pertaining to volumes of private capital investments, manufacturing output in various industries and agriculture, exports and imports, etc., were overfulfilled in a number of countries. When conditions deteriorated, however, as they did in the late 1970's and early 1980's, the nonfulfillment of programs became a common phenomenon and generally acquired sizable dimensions. This is particularly true of overall rates of economic development; instead of the 5-8 percent stipulated in plans, the actual rate, according to available statistics, was 2-4 percent a year.¹¹

It cannot be said that the national governments made no effort to channel private economic activity and national economic development in planned directions. Aside from the "obsessive planning" characteristic of many governments in the 1960's, when it was too frequently assumed that plans and programs would be fulfilled almost automatically, certain measures were taken to stimulate the development of the private capitalist sector. In most cases, however, they did not produce the anticipated results. In the first place, these measures were generally not comprehensive--that is, they encompassed far from all aspects of private economic activity; in the second place, they were sometimes implemented formally, and not always within the framework of a single strategy of national development; in the third place--and this is the most important reason--they were too weak to withstand the effects of the spontaneous regulators of commodity and monetary transactions.¹²

As a result, the planning activities of African states have had a positive impact only under favorable external circumstances--that is, when they have been "superimposed" on the appropriate set of market conditions and have not contradicted them. This is precisely the reason for certain successes in industrialization in capitalist developing countries, the increased output of some agricultural products in a number of countries (primarily for export), etc. These cases, however, are quite rare. The private sector is still developing spontaneously and does not respond well to state planning. It is precisely the state sector, however, that is predominant in the majority of African countries and it is on this sector that all economic development ultimately depends.

Finally, some sections of the "all-encompassing" plans in capitalist developing countries remain unfulfilled simply because little effort is made to fulfill them. This applies primarily to socioeconomic goals, such as the eradication of unemployment, the equalization of the income of various

population strata, the development of particularly underdeveloped regions, etc. The facts show that all of these objectives are usually set only for propaganda purposes.¹³

The situation with regard to the majority of intergovernmental programs is similar. The most effective are short-range bilateral agreements on cooperation, and the least effective are multilateral trade agreements which depend totally on conditions in international commodity markets. Agreements on regional economic integration are carried out too slowly and in an atmosphere of sharp conflicts between participating countries. For this reason, the majority of these agreements in Africa have remained essentially formal. The ECOWAS countries, for example, took 5 years just to draw up a program for the creation of a regional common market. The compilation of programs of regional economic cooperation is going just as slowly. Perhaps the only major result of this cooperation was the commencement of work in 1981 on a joint project for the development of the Senegal River delta (Senegal, Mali and Mauritania)--the construction of the first of two projected dams in the Diouma region.¹⁴ The reasons for these delays in the compilation and implementation of regional integration programs consist not only in the sometimes serious conflicts between participating countries (at the end of the 1970's, for example, these conflicts led to the collapse of the West African economic community to which Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda belonged), but also in the absence of sufficient government funds in the African countries for the financing of these programs. All specific projects generally presuppose financing from outside, mainly from developed capitalist states.

What are the real possibilities and prospects of heightening the efficiency of government planning activity in the African countries?

Any kind of planning represents an important part of the more general activity involved in the management of various processes. The object of management should have the kind of properties that make its management not only possible, but also necessary for the successful occurrence of the managed process or, furthermore, for its very existence. The theory and practice of socialist planning testify that the most reliable objective prerequisite of plan fulfillment is common ownership of the most important physical factors of the object of planning, particularly the means of production. Another necessary factor is the stability of the external conditions under which the planned process occurs. The most important subjective prerequisite (reflecting the presence of an objective basis but displaying relatively independent development) are, in our opinion, the existence of sufficiently mature other elements of the system for the management of planned processes, namely effective organizations, systems for regulation, accounting and control, etc. Even when these prerequisites of state planning are developed to any degree in the African countries, this only occurs within the framework of the state sector. This is why there have been certain successes in the implementation of development programs, particularly in the countries with a socialist orientation. The private sector, however, does not have these prerequisites; by its very nature as a sector separated into independent and competing economic units, its overall development can only be spontaneous--that is, essentially haphazard.

But the state sector does not exist on its own; it is an organic part of the societal structures in which it develops and experiences the strongest reciprocal influence from the private sector, both within the country and abroad. The smaller the scales of the state sector and the more highly developed its productive and other connections with the unmanaged "environment," the stronger this influence will be. These connections destabilize the activities of the state sector and introduce elements of spontaneity and unpredictability into this activity. State sectors in any country experience this kind of negative outside influence, but it is particularly apparent in the developing African countries. A significant role here is also played by the very socio-political aims of activity in the state sector: In the capitalist developing countries they rank below the interests of private capitalist enterprise. This limits the size of the state sector and, what is most important, essentially turns it into an appendage of private economic capitalism.¹⁵

The situation in the countries with a socialist orientation is radically different in this respect, particularly as progressive, revolutionary-democratic reforms are carried out on a broader scale and more intensively. The state sector, and not the private sector, is the quantitatively predominant and leading economic structure; instead of being a subordinate sector, all private enterprise in the country is subordinated to it. This is the reason for the clear tendency toward the creation of an integral system of government management of the state sector. In other words, the subjective and objective prerequisites of planning in the state sector in the countries with a socialist orientation are much more mature and more highly developed in general than in the capitalist developing countries; all other conditions being equal, this is reflected in much more effective planning. Nevertheless, even in these countries the state sector is quite dependent on the world capitalist economy, and in many cases it can be the main reason for the partial fulfillment or even the scrapping of various plans and programs.

When the actual possibilities and limits of state planning in the developing African countries are assessed, however, the possibility of purposeful influence by the state sector on private economic enterprise within the country must not be excluded. In fact, if this influence is strong enough and extends to all of the main "entrances" and "exits" of the private enterprises concerned, it combines the latter with the state sector in a single economic organism, placing the functioning of this organism above their interests and thereby diluting the private nature of their activity. This is also why it is possible for the government to manage these enterprises and, consequently, to plan their activities. Obviously, this possibility only arises when the state sector and state policy have reached a certain level of development--that is, it arises in principle only within the framework of a socialist scheme of societal development.

It should be stressed that far from all private economic enterprises are naturally suitable for inclusion in this kind of unique state-private economic complex. In our opinion, in Africa the most difficult private enterprises to include in an integral complex are, on the one hand, small seminatural and commercial economic units and, on the other, foreign companies. The inclusion of medium-size and large capitalist enterprises

operating primarily for the domestic market is much easier. This is apparently one of the significant factors in the improvement of government planning practices in the African states and other developing countries and, in the broader context, in the elaboration of their state policy on the private sector.

Why is it that in spite of all the complexity and ineffectiveness of plans for the development of private economic production in the African countries, including those with a capitalist orientation, "all-encompassing" planning, with its emphasis, at least officially, on macroeconomics and even (but later) on social processes, came into being and developed? Here it is important to consider two factors. In the first place, there was the influence of bourgeois economic programs, which evolved into national planning in the developing countries. Bourgeois researchers, as we know, have had to acknowledge the importance of planning, but they regard it primarily as an organizational economic phenomenon and do not acknowledge its socioeconomic nature--that is, the need for certain societal (economic, social and political) prerequisites for successful planning.¹⁶ In many cases, "all-encompassing" national plans and intergovernmental programs have been drawn up primarily for political reasons or even just for the sake of prestige and have been expected to have a definite propaganda impact. In the second place, many governments have wanted to make use of the experience in socialist planning. It is not surprising that the majority of national plans in the African states and other developing countries have been 5-year plans. The example set by the Soviet 5-year plans, during the course of which the USSR evolved so quickly from a backward country into the leading socialist power in the economic, technical and scientific respect, was too appealing not to use, even though this was an example of planning under fundamentally different societal conditions.

When we evaluate the significance of planning in the African countries, despite all of its shortcomings we must bear in mind that its chief element is a multitude of government programs which have been carried out successfully on the whole. The expansion of the state sector, which takes place in accordance with these programs to some degree, creates some of the prerequisites for, on the one hand, the more successful planning of its development and, on the other, stronger influence on private enterprise by future government plans.

Although the "all-encompassing" plans remain partially on paper, they also play a definite positive role. Their appearance and spread in Africa have contributed to a better awareness of major social problems on the continent and to the formulation of national development strategies. The failures of the first plans focused government attention on problems in their fulfillment, particularly the need to improve all government activity, including the management of the state sector, the regulation of private economic activity and the regulation of the work of planning agencies themselves. Many governments also realize the need for certain structural--that is, socioeconomic--reforms within countries and for changes in the international economic order as essential prerequisites for more efficient planning on the national and regional levels.

At the same time, the continued improvement of the planning practices of African states, the enhancement of their effectiveness and the degree of their influence on societal development will be geared, it seems to us, primarily to existing possibilities and prerequisites for government regulation on the continent. Above all, this applies to the more efficient planning of government activity itself, including the development of the state sector. It is probable that the ambitious "all-encompassing" national plans will be replaced by more modest, but realistic "particular" short- and medium-range programs (and the more general social and economic processes will remain essentially an object of forecasting). For this kind of planning to be more successful, it will naturally have to be comprehensive--that is, it will have to encompass the entire process by which the state sector is managed, from the compilation of realistic programs and scientific forecasts of possible changes in the "environment" to the creation of the organizational, economic, political and other prerequisites to ensure that government practices deviate as little as possible from plans. The most important guideline will be the progressive growth of the state sector, with the inclusion of all of the "commanding" heights of the economic and social sphere in this sector. More efficient government regulation of private economic activity will necessitate certain structural changes in the national economy. These include cooperative societies of peasant farms and small-scale commercial production and distribution, including the lowest forms of capitalist enterprise. In the case of medium-sized and large national business, the necessary effect can be produced in many cases by cartels and syndicates (even compulsory, if necessary), with the creation of joint state-private companies and all of the different forms of leases and concessions which played a positive role in the USSR during the period of the New Economic Policy. These and other such measures cannot be expected to produce substantial positive results, however, as long as the country's foreign economic ties are geared to the world capitalist market with its unpredictable features. For the successful economic development of the African countries it will be important for these ties, in the first place, to be governed more strictly by plans--that is, to be developed within the framework of bilateral or multilateral intergovernmental agreements--and, in the second place, to be more fully subordinate to national programs. A good example of the possibility and utility of this kind of agreement is the series of treaties on economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation between African and socialist states.

The significant and substantial expansion of the scales of government planning in the developing African countries and the enhancement of its effectiveness will be a complex and lengthy task. In principle, it will require the elimination of all the abovementioned political, economic and social obstacles, whether internal or external. On the national level, this will actually mean the renunciation of capitalist development and the institution of extensive and radical socioeconomic reforms. The international aspect of the problem is connected with the radical reorganization of present-day international economic relations in order to turn them into truly equitable and mutually beneficial relations based on multilateral and constant cooperation by states.

FOOTNOTES

1. In the developed countries the program is generally a detailed plan pertaining to a particular sphere (or area) of societal life or a section of a more general plan.
2. For more about this, see, for example, the chapter entitled "The Planning of Socioeconomic Development" in "Zarubezhnyy Vostok i sovremennost'" [The Foreign East and the Present Day], Vol 1, Moscow, 1980, pp 234-258.
3. "ECA. Strategy for the African Region in the International Development Strategy for the United Nations Third Development Decade," E/CN. 14/Inf. 107, "OAU. Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980-2000," Geneva, 1981.
4. For more detail, see M. Kuznetsova, "Economic Integration in West Africa," AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, 1982, No 5; I. V. Cherkasova, "The African States in the Struggle Against South African Economic Expansion," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1983, No 4.
5. Calculated by us according to data from: INDUSTRIES ET TRAVAUX D'OUTREMER, January, February, March 1981; January, February 1982.
6. Ibid., January 1981, p 27; January 1982, p 17.
7. Ibid., January 1981, p 20.
8. BIKI, 1980, No 11, p 2.
9. THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 16 July 1979, Suppl, p XI.
10. Ibid.
11. "ECA. Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa. 1980-1981," E/ECA/CM, 8/17, Addis Ababa, 18 March 1982, p 21.
12. For more detail, see S. A. Bessonov, "Natsional'nyye plany i ekonomicheskoye razivitiye stran Afriki" [National Plans and the Economic Development of the African Countries], Moscow, 1975, Ch V.
13. For more detail, see "Gosudarstvennyy kapitalizm i sotsial'naya evolyutsiya stran zarubezhnogo Vostoka" [State Capitalism and the Social Evolution of the Countries of the Foreign East], Moscow, 1980, pp 264-281.
14. AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN, Economic, Financial and Technical Series, Exeter, 1982, p 6027.
15. For more detail, see the chapter entitled "The Organizational Economic Structure of the State Sector" in the monograph "Gosudarstvennyy sektor v stranakh Afriki" [The State Sector in the African Countries] (Moscow, 1976).
16. For more detail, see S. A. Bessonov, Op. cit., Ch III.

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POLITICIZING THE LANGUAGE ISSUE IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE FOREIGN EAST

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[Article by L. B. Nikol'skiy]

[Text] The tendency to politicize the language issue--that is, to give a language political significance and to turn it into an object and weapon of fierce political struggle, as in the case of the serious conflicts in Eastern countries (for example, Pakistan in 1948 and India in 1964)--takes place only under certain sociopolitical conditions. By its very nature, language is a means of communication in an ethnic community and a form of cultural expression, indifferent to classes, population strata and professional and territorial groups and politically neutral. The use of language by social groups, however, generally leads to certain linguistic peculiarities stemming from interaction with the environment and differences in occupation, way of life and culture in general. But this social-territorial differentiation of the language does not undermine its basic function as a medium for the exchange of information and an expression of the material and spiritual culture of the ethnic community. The state of the language as a linguistic system, the wealth of its vocabulary, the variety of its expressions and its stylistic flexibility depend on the needs of intraethnic communication and culture during the given stage of the ethnic group's development.

The ability of the language to satisfy the communicative and cultural needs of various social-territorial groups is the reason why it is regarded as an essential attribute of the ethnic group and the common property of its members. This is also the reason for the political neutrality of language, distinguishing it from other social phenomena. The members of an ethnic group regard their language as something inherent and usually give it as little notice as the air they breathe. This is why linguistic problems generally do not arise within an ethnic group.

Members of an ethnic group take a greater interest in their language when they establish close relations with another ethnic group and when the need arises to interact and communicate with communities speaking other languages. One of the consequences of these contacts is the recognition of the irrefutable fact that language is the first and most significant feature distinguishing one ethnic group from another. Furthermore, the members of a particular ethnic community usually, and quite subjectively, are inclined to believe that their language

sounds better, is more beautiful and has greater powers of communication and expression than the language of another ethnic group. The latter, however, requires several stipulations. In reality, there are many cases in which the same language is used by several ethnic groups, and each of these groups has the right to call the language its own. This occurs as a result of the migration or resettlement of one group, its inclusion in various governments or the division of a previously integral ethnic community, when another ethnic group settles on its territory and the native group tends to disperse. If different segments of an ethnic group live in isolation from one another for a long time, linguistic divergence will introduce distinctive features into a once common language, and these features permit the isolated segment of the ethnic group to regard its language as a modified form rather than the original language.¹ Sometimes two or more languages are used in an ethnic community. This occurs when the community consists of various ethnic elements which are undergoing a process of consolidation or coexist in one state with one or several other communities. The resulting bilingualism does not extend to the entire ethnic group, and the integrity of the group is still based on the use of the native language.² When more than one language is used in a single ethnic community, the people using these languages regard them in different ways. For example, the majority of bilingual Berbers feel that Arabic is superior to Berber as a means of communication in all spheres with the exception of intimate conversation or communication within the family.³ The Kurds who speak Arabic feel that it is more suited to religious practices than Kurdish and is a better lingua franca in communication with Arabs and Muslims speaking other languages, but the Kurdish language is more expressive and better suited to other purposes.⁴

Sometimes a segment of the ethnic community might feel contempt for the native language, but this is generally the result of sociopsychological factors. For example, since the population of India's Punjab consisted of three religious groups--Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs--and since the clericalization of languages had taken place in this region (the Punjab Muslims prefer Urdu, the Hindus speak Hindi and only the Sikhs speak Punjabi), it is natural that the inhabitants who prefer languages connected with their religious preference might feel contempt for their native language.⁵ Nevertheless, most people idealize the linguistic properties of their own language. At the same time, the recognition of the ethnic importance of a language by the members of a community and their tendency to idealize their language do not preclude the political neutrality of language and do not give it political significance. The ascription of political significance to a language stems primarily from interethnic relations.

Interethnic relations can be equal or unequal: 1) Equality--in those cases when the ethnic groups enjoy state sovereignty or autonomy within a state--such as, for example, the relations between ethnic groups of politically independent states on the one hand or the relations between ethnic groups in the USSR and other multinational socialist countries on the other. In both cases, the languages of these groups are judicially equal⁶ and no one language enjoys a privileged status. 2) Inequality--when one ethnic group dominates another politically, as was the case in the relations between the ethnic groups of colonial or semicolonial countries and their mother countries or is now the

case in the multinational capitalist countries of the East and the young states with a capitalist orientation. These relations existed during the colonial era between the Japanese, Dutch and English minorities in Korea, Indonesia and India. The same relations existed between the Malay, Chinese and Indian inhabitants of Malaysia, the Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Persians, Kurds, Azerbaijani, Arabs and other nationalities in Iran, etc. The political inequality of ethnic groups is reflected in the judicial hierarchy of languages when, for example, the first languages listed above (Malay or Malaysian, Sinhala and Persian) are declared the official or state language of the entire country while the rest of the languages receive official recognition at best only as a means of communication in regions populated by the corresponding ethnic groups. When the language of a particular ethnic group is declared the state language, this generally signifies additional privileges for this politically dominant ethnic group and more pronounced ethnic inequality.

The inequality of ethnic groups, which stems in part from the legally secured judicial inequality of their languages, can give rise to interethnic conflicts and create the kind of situations in which a language acquires political significance. Interethnic clashes in the countries of the foreign East generally come into being within a country and can sometimes evolve into inter-state conflicts. These inter-state conflicts can arise, particularly in connection with border questions, when one state claims the territory of another state populated by the same nationality but ceded to the other state before or during the decolonization process. As yet, there have been no open conflicts between Eastern states connected with discrimination against the language of an ethnic group inhabiting more than one state. However, when conflicts break out over other issues, one side tries to take advantage of the dissatisfaction of the segment of the ethnic group in the other country with what it regards as the unfair resolution of the language problem. Just as frequently, however, the part of the ethnic group in the other state needs no protection because it regards itself as an integral part of the country's population.

Therefore, interethnic contradictions and conflicts arising from the inequality of ethnic groups are generally intragovernmental by their very nature. The fact that inequality tends to make ethnic inequities more pronounced was pointed out above in general terms. In more specific terms, languages can be considered unequal in the following cases: 1) when favorable conditions are established for the functioning and development of only one or a few languages while the rest, despite their importance as a means of communication and despite the wishes of the people speaking them, are crowded out of important spheres of public life and their development is restricted in every way possible; 2) when ruling circles are concerned about the functioning and development of one or a few languages and treat the rest as if they were of secondary importance⁷ and undeserving of support.

The inequality of languages in the first case and in the second is often legislatively secured (in constitutions or laws) and acquires features of judicial inequality. What is more, in some countries the status of only one language (or two) is defined, while the rest are simply ignored. In other

states a hierarchy of the main languages is established and spheres of communication are distributed among them. For example, the constitutions of Burma (1974) and Pakistan (1973) and the new Iranian constitution adopted after the Islamic revolution of 1979 name only one state language (Burmese, Urdu and Persian), while other native languages are not mentioned and their status is not defined.⁸ In the Indian constitution, on the other hand, 14 regional languages are listed in addition to Hindi, the state language, including the now dead Sanskrit language which is not an official language in any Indian administrative-territorial unit (Appendix VIII of the constitution lists Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Malayalam, Marathi, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu and Urdu).

The definition of different statuses for Hindi and the 14 main languages in the Indian constitution does not reflect, as it might seem at first glance, the functional hierarchy of the Indian languages or the linguistic situation in the country. The fact is that Hindi, the state language, still does not serve as an official means of communication between all states. It is not accepted by the southern states with Dravidian languages, and English still serves as a means of interethnic and official communication throughout India. Furthermore, the real official languages of some states, primarily new ones, are languages not included in Appendix VIII: the Khasi language (in the state of Meghalaya, formed in 1970) and the Manipuri language (Manipur, 1972). Furthermore, literary Hindi is not being used widely enough even in the states of the Hindi-speaking belt, where linguistic forms traditionally categorized as Hindi dialects still play a significant role in the life of the local population (Braj, Bhojpuri, Rajasthani, Chattisgarhi, Maithili and others).

The numerous Sanskrit terms in literary Hindi and the difficulty of this language for rural inhabitants of these states create a dilemma for the schools: Should literary Hindi be taught in elementary school or should the abovementioned linguistic forms be used in the initial stages of education? On the whole, the significance and role of these forms, which are widely used in everyday life, are not reflected at all in the constitution.

The linguistic inequality recorded in the constitution is not enough to create or intensify interethnic conflicts. These conflicts, "in the final analysis, usually stem from socioeconomic factors."⁹ In other words, differences in the sociolegal statuses of coexisting ethnic communities, the lack of equal opportunities in the satisfaction of physical demands and the resulting dissatisfaction of the ethnic group or groups with limited rights are the main cause of conflict. For example, a movement for the creation of linguistic provinces sprang up in India in the colonial era, at the very beginning of the 1920's. It came into being at a time when the administrative divisions of British India did not coincide with the boundaries of ethnic settlements. This inhibited the sociocultural development of ethnic groups and prevented ethnic consolidation by creating the problem of numerous minorities and introducing friction into interethnic relations.¹⁰ The linguistic province represents a form of national-territorial autonomy, in which an ethnic community is given the most favorable conditions for its development and its rights are protected against encroachment by other communities. In addition, the interests

of specific classes lay at the basis of the desire for autonomy: "Autonomy of the states is supported by part of the bourgeoisie (mainly the middle stratum), which is being crowded out of business by big capital operating on the national level, and a certain segment of the intelligentsia and employee class, who have been motivated by rising unemployment to demand that the interests of the 'sons of the earth' be defended."¹¹ In West Bengal "the main cause of the Bihari movement for autonomy from Bengal was the desire of the emerging Bihari bourgeoisie to escape the competition of the stronger Bengali bourgeoisie."¹²

It is natural that official status for the language of the majority of a national-territorial unit is the first demand put forth in a movement for national autonomy.

Incidentally, the interests of specific classes and social strata are also reflected in measures with the opposite purpose--that is, the resistance of the movement for national autonomy. For example, the nationalist policy of the United National Party in Sri Lanka was reflected, in particular, in its 1955 slogan "Sinhala must be the only state language." This line was supported primarily by the "new rural leaders"--influential Buddhists, money-lenders, small landowners, native teachers and local sages who did not have an English education and had no access to government service¹³ (in contrast to the elite strata of the Sri Lankan Tamils, who supported the British colonial administration with its incentive to maintain friction in interethnic relations). These strata were working toward the rebirth of the traditional Sinhalese culture and literature and believed that only Sinhala could be the language of the new and independent state. In India as well, "the grand bourgeoisie, particularly monopolies operating on the national level, has an interest in the partial or even complete elimination of autonomy (and, consequently, in the use of one state language instead of many regional languages--L. N.)."¹⁴

A second cause of interethnic conflicts is the "overt (or externally camouflaged) political domination of one ethnic community by another."¹⁵ For example, the Bengalis, who represent the overwhelming majority of the population of East Pakistan, objected when Urdu was declared the only state language and have been demanding equal status for the Bengali language since the first years of the State of Pakistan's existence. The persistent struggle for the Bengali language was the beginning¹⁶ and an organic part of the movement for national self-determination that led to the formation of the new state of Bangladesh in 1971.

Sometimes interethnic conflicts are exacerbated because one ethnic community is afraid of being dominated by another, and this gives political pertinence to the language issue. This generally occurs when the language of one community is to be declared the state language or the only official language of the region and when this status is to be legally secured. It is significant that this language plays the same role de facto even before the law is passed. The Tamils and Bengalis had an indicative reaction, for example, to the Indian central government's decision to accomplish the transition from English to Hindi in official national communication on schedule (by 1965). A mass protest movement was launched in Tamil Nadu and Bengal in 1964. Hindi, however, is the

most widely used language in India. Another example is the tendency of the ethnic groups inhabiting the small states of northeastern India to reject Assamese as the only official language and replace it with Hindi, although the former has long been used as a means of interethnic communication in this region and the latter is not widely used here. The declaration of Assamese as the official language of the State of Assam in 1960 was the cause of major unrest among the Bengalis (17 percent of the population). Small ethnic groups interpreting this as a threat to assimilation also objected to the decision.¹⁷ The substitution of Hindi for the Assamese language is supposed to eradicate the political superiority of the Assamese and put all ethnic groups on an equal footing by compelling all of them to learn this language.¹⁸

At the same time, the social strata and groups of an ethnic community do not always express unanimous discontent with the dominant position of another ethnic group or object to it. In this respect, various strata of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka had an indicative reaction to the Bandaranaike government's decision that the Tamil language would be the language of the main ethnic minority and the official language of the north and east provinces and that the Tamils would have the right to be educated in the Tamil language and take government service examinations in this language as long as they also spoke Sinhala. The response to the government decision was positive among the Sri Lankan Tamils, with the exception of extremist elements¹⁹ with an incentive to preserve friction in Sinhalese-Tamil relations and with an eye on separatist goals. In this way, they have used the Tamil language for purposes of political manipulation.

Language also acquires political significance--that is, it is politicized--when it is deliberately used in the attainment of sociopolitical goals. American sociolinguist J. Rubin suggests, in particular, that distinctions be drawn between: 1) the achievement of broader public participation in national politics; 2) the creation of ethnic unity and the stimulation of collectivization; 3) the achievement of economic advantages; 4) the selection and transmission of information.²⁰

Efforts to use language for broader public participation in sociopolitical life and in economic and governmental construction in the young states were made everywhere after the declaration of independence, especially in multinational countries when it came time to choose a language for statewide communication which was the prevailing language and was previously used as a means of interethnic communication. It was precisely the desire to secure the mobilization of the popular masses, and not merely considerations of prestige, which made one of the native languages the state language in all of the newly liberated countries. In contrast to the West European languages, which performed this function during the colonial era, these were the languages of the majority of the population rather than the language of a minority--the colonizers and the local elite.

The very choice of a native language as the state language and the plan to substitute it for a West European language could be interpreted as evidence of the democratization of social life after the declaration of independence, and as a means of involving broad segments of the population in the construction

of an independent state. At the same time, the scales and depth of this process did not depend just on the declaration of a relatively new state language, but also on practical measures aimed at the spread of the native language and on the consistency and persistence with which ruling circles and governments implemented these declarations. Serious objective difficulties were encountered during the process of their implementation: political complications arising from the negative attitude of some ethnic groups toward the language declared the state language; a stubborn reluctance to give up the use of the West European language, characteristic of the European-educated elite; purely linguistic difficulties arising from the linguistic inadequacy of the native language for communication in a contemporary state. Furthermore, there were at least two reasons for the negative attitude of elite strata toward the native language. First of all, there was the fear of losing an important social prerogative: Fluency in the West European language opened the door to government service and to prestigious and high-paying jobs and guarded established positions in society against contenders from the petty bourgeois and lower strata. This, for example, is precisely the reason for the slow introduction of the Arabic language in major spheres of communication in Tunisia, the dissatisfaction expressed with the intensification of the Arabization process by some members of the creative intelligentsia in Algeria,²¹ who were used to writing in French, and the appeals of members of the Indian ruling elite for the preservation of the English language's special status, because they view it "not only as a familiar medium of communication, but also as an obvious social privilege."²² Secondly, the increased dependence of economic development on the familiarization of capitalist Eastern countries with world scientific and technical achievements has tended to keep the number of people fluent in West European languages, primarily English, quite high. The number of persons knowing these languages is increasing as a result of the return of specialists trained abroad to their homeland.

The choice of a language also depends on the particular ethnic group whose members are in power. Within the framework of bourgeois democracy, the language issue is rarely resolved in the interests of the masses, and "representatives of various language groups launch political campaigns over the language issue and take **EFFECTIVE** [in boldface] steps to solve the language problem in their own interest"²³ (emphasis ours--L. N.).

On the whole, the tendency toward democratization and the involvement of the popular masses in the construction of an independent state presuppose the choice of a language acceptable to the majority. But this depends largely on the political orientation of ruling circles: Conservative governments do not care about the accessibility of the official language to the popular masses, but progressive governments try to choose an official language with a view to the actual linguistic situation.²⁴

According to the studies of Soviet ethnographers,²⁵ language is one of the most important elements of the ethnic consciousness. It is generally prominent among the elements of ethnic identification. The use of language for the attainment of ethnic unity is based on the fact that the members of an ethnic group who use one language develop a sense of solidarity along with their common ethnic consciousness. Intraethnic solidarity, sensed by all members of

the community, regardless of their social status, is strongest and most apparent under extreme conditions, when the ethnic group becomes the target of ethnic discrimination and its language is attacked and reviled. The class and social conflicts dividing the community then move into the background temporarily, while the protection of the community becomes the foremost goal.²⁶ This can also create the semblance of social unity. Intraethnic solidarity of this kind was characteristic of all peoples during the initial stage of the national liberation struggle, when they were fighting against colonialism and for national self-determination. It was also characteristic of many peoples after liberation--for example, the Bengalis and Tamils in India at the beginning of the 1960's, when they objected to the compulsory use of Hindi as the state language. When relations between communities are peaceful, this solidarity generally serves as a basis of ethnic identification. In this case, the language of a community is regarded as a feature of its linguistic uniqueness, emphasizing its unity and its separation from other communities. The use of language can give several economic or material advantages to the ethnic community using the language, as well as to its individual members, and this is a strong enough motive for the retention and protection of a language. As mentioned above, several nationalities in India have displayed a desire for autonomy (the Santals, Gonds, Bhils and others). But the demand for autonomy has not always been preceded by actual consolidation or the resulting creation of ethnic groups requiring territorial autonomy for their further development. For example, in India the popular masses of several ethnic communities living in the administrative-territorial units (states and districts) of other nationalities associate the improvement of their economic status with the attainment of autonomy, while their elite strata are insisting on autonomy to protect their local interests against encroachment by the grand bourgeoisie.²⁷

The distribution of languages among certain professions or occupations is a common phenomenon in the foreign East, particularly in multinational countries where the languages of former mother countries are still being used. Highly prestigious and high-paid professions require a knowledge of West European languages, less prestigious jobs with lower salaries require fluency in a native language, etc. This means that the knowledge of a West European language paves the way to social advancement. A field study conducted in 1968 in the Philippines indicated, for example, that the majority of Filipinos did not want their children to attend schools where classes were taught in Filipino. They sent their children to English schools because the knowledge of English promised several economic advantages.²⁸

The very content and nature of information depend on the language used by the mass media in the newly liberated countries. The press, radio and television in young Asian and African countries still rely to a considerable extent on foreign sources of information, which often present events in a distorted light. Furthermore, many of their radio and TV programs are foreign. In the middle of the 1970's, for example, programs made in Western countries and only transmitted to newly liberated countries represented around 55 percent of the radio programs in the foreign East.²⁹ As for television, the respective ratios of imported to national programs in Indonesia, Algeria and Singapore were 35:65, 50:50 and 58:42 in 1973-1974.³⁰

The dependence of television in many African countries on the West is attested to, for example, by the fact that English and American television companies bought up 60 percent of Kenya's air time for the next 10 years in 1969.³¹ The balance between imported and national programs is rapidly tipping in favor of programs made in the young states. In Algeria, for example, where Arabic is being substituted for the French language, the proportion accounted for by national programs rose from 25 to 49 percent between 1969 and 1973.³² Nevertheless, the reliance on foreign sources gives the choice of a transmitting language political significance.

Language can also be used to preserve the culture of a people and guard it against the influence of another culture. It is not only a form of cultural expression, but also a significant and organic part of the culture. This is why the mastery of any language, particularly under the conditions of daily contact with another ethnic community, usually signifies familiarization with its culture. This fact has been taken into consideration by various purists who insist on the removal of foreign words from their language, not because these words come from other languages but because they are regarded as elements of an alien culture. The connection between these efforts and the struggle against foreign influence was particularly apparent during certain periods of Iranian history. The country was engulfed by a wave of nationalism in the late 1920's and early 1930's. At this time, the Academy of Language and Literature wanted to purify the Persian language of all Arabic and West European words and to revive old terms from the Persian vocabulary. Two attempts were made (in 1928 and 1933) to reform the contemporary Persian written language (borrowed from the Arabs) on the basis of ancient Persian cuneiform.³³ In the 1970's there was another "wave of demonstrations for the protection of the Iranian culture, the Persian language and Persian literature from various 'harmful influences,' including the Western influence."³⁴

Another example can also be used to illustrate the use of the native language in the struggle against an alien culture. When China ruled Vietnam, Vietnamese texts were written in Chinese characters (this also occurred in Japan and Korea). This method of writing Vietnamese texts, known as "Chu Nho," continued to be used after the country was liberated in 939. When France began to colonize Vietnam (1858), the French resolved to combat the Chinese cultural influence, which they expected to grow stronger as a reaction to French colonial conquests. In particular, they viewed the continued use of the Chinese language and Chinese characters as a sign of Chinese cultural influence. For this reason, in contrast to other parts of the world, where the French culture did not have such a strong rival and where the French colonizers took every opportunity to stifle local languages and cultivate the use of French, in Vietnam the Vietnamese language was used in administrative affairs during the initial stage of colonization. By 1861 the colonial administration had already ordered the compilation and publication of a Vietnamese-French dictionary. It put an end to the Chinese system of qualifying examinations, which required fluency in Chinese and a knowledge of Chinese classical and canonical literature. Vietnamese-language newspapers began to be published in a previously developed Romanized script. When all of these measures had considerably weakened the Chinese cultural influence by the beginning of the 20th century, the colonial administration made the transition to a "policy of direct control," signifying the limited use of Vietnamese and its replacement by the French language.³⁵

The tendency to politicize the language issue as an objective result of the sociopolitical factors distinguishing a particular ethnic community and the use of language in the attainment of sociopolitical goals are not the only cases in which language acquires political significance. The members of an ethnic group develop definite feelings about their language, and this becomes a fact of their social mentality. This makes the use of language for political purposes possible.³⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. For a discussion of the conditions and nature of the linguistic divergence of isolated segments of ethnic groups, see G. V. Stepanov, "K probleme yazykovogo var'irovaniya" [An Investigation of Linguistic Variance], Moscow, 1979.
2. Cases in which new languages have been adopted by whole ethnic communities have been reported (see, for example, J. R. Goody, "Ethnological Notes on the Distribution of the Guang Language," JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LANGUAGES, 1963, No 2), testifying that the language of an ethnic group is not necessarily its native language. The group can also regard an adopted language as its own.
3. Incidentally, in connection with the intensification of the Arabization process, accompanied by the replacement of the French language by Arabic in all spheres, the Berbers of the Maghreb countries have displayed a different attitude toward their native language in the 1980's. Its recognition as the official language of the Berber-speaking regions, its use in the schools and so forth are being demanded.
4. C. A. Ferguson, "On Sociolinguistically Oriented Language Surveys," in "Language Surveys in Developing Nations," Arlington, 1979, p 1.
5. B. I. Klyuyev, "Natsional'no-yazykovyye problemy nezavisimoy Indii" [National Language Problems in Independent India], Moscow, 1978, p 77.
6. The judicial equality of languages is certainly not tantamount to their equal use and value as means of communication. Even when languages are judicially equal, they can be used in different spheres of communication, and in unequal proportions. For example, the language of the largest ethnic group is generally also dominant in the functional respect: It is the most widely used, it serves the greatest number of spheres of communication, including statewide communication, and it must be mastered by the small communities living in the same state.
7. "The policy of Pakistani ruling circles on the language issue...led to a situation in which the languages of the overwhelming majority of the population, particularly in West Pakistan, were assigned inferior status" (Yu. V. Gankovskiy, "Natsional'nyy vopros i natsional'nyye dvizheniya v Pakistane" [The Issue of Nationality and Ethnic Movements in Pakistan], Moscow, 1967, p 89).

8. It is true that the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan grants provincial administrative bodies the right to choose the official language of the province. Even this secures the judicial inequality of languages, however, because some have the status of state languages while others are only provincial.
9. Yu. V. Bromley, "Sovremennyye problemy etnografii" [Current Issues in Ethnography], Moscow, 1981, p 320.
10. A. A. Prazauskas, "The Experience and Evolution of Indian Federalism," in "Natsional'nyy vopros v stranakh Vostoka" [The Question of Nationality in the Eastern Countries], Moscow, 1982, pp 155-156.
11. Ibid., p 166.
12. "Etnicheskiye protsessy v stranakh Yuzhnoy Azii" [Ethnic Processes in the South Asian Countries], Moscow, 1976, p 132.
13. A. D. Dridzo, V. I. Kochnev and I. M. Semashko, "Indiytsy i pakistanttsy za rubezhom" [Indians and Pakistanis Abroad], Moscow, 1978, p 36.
14. A. A. Prazauskas, Op. cit., p 167.
15. Yu. V. Bromley, Op. cit., p 321.
16. "Bangladesh is probably the only country in modern history where the struggle for independence began with a 'language movement'" (M. Moniruzzaman, "Language Planning in Bangladesh," LANGUAGE PLANNING NEWSLETTER, 1979, vol 5, No 3, p 1).
17. A. A. Prazauskas, "The Movement for the Creation of the State of Meghalaya," in "Indiya--soyuz shtatov. Problemy politicheskogo i sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya" [India--A Union of States. Problems in Political and Socioeconomic Development], Moscow, 1981, p 113.
18. A. A. Prazauskas, "The Experience and Evolution of Indian Federalism," pp 174-175.
19. A. A. Dridzo, V. I. Kochnev and I. M. Semashko, Op. cit., p 36.
20. J. Rubin, "Language and Politics from a Sociologue Point of View," in "Language and Politics," The Hague-Paris, Mouton, 1977, p 396.
21. In addition, much of the Algerian intelligentsia is of the Kabyle nationality and has ties with the Kabyle bourgeoisie, which views Arabization as an attempt by its rivals to undermine its position.
22. B. I. Klyuyev, Op. cit., p 179.
23. K. L. Gandhi, "Language Policy in Present-Day India," Moscow, 1982, p 17.

24. R. Corsetti, "Lingue e politica," in: M. B. M. Abaurre, A. Bansani, E. Bertoncini et al, "Lingue e politica: imperialismi, identità nazionali e politiche, linguistiche in Asia, Africa, America Latina," Rome, 1976.
25. See, for example, M. N. Guboglo, "Experiment in the Preliminary Classification of Ethnic Milieus for the Experimental Study of Ethnolinguistic Processes," in "Itogi polevykh rabot Instituta etnografii v 1970 g." [Results of Ethnography Institute Field Studies in 1970], Moscow, 1971; V. V. Pimenov, "Some Features of Ethnic Awareness (Based on Information About the Udmurt ASSR)," in "Torzhestvo leninskoy natsional'noy politiki" [The Triumph of Lenin's Policy on Nationalities], Cheboksary, 1972; G. V. Staroboytova, "An Investigation of the Ethnic Mentality of Urbanites," SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, 1976, No 3.
26. B. I. Klyuyev, Op. cit., p 14.
27. A. A. Prazauskas, "Experience and Evolution of Indian Federalism," p 167.
28. Bonifacio P. Sibayan, "Survey of Language Use and Attitudes Towards Language in the Philippines," in "Language Surveys in Developing Nations," p 121.
29. E. Katz and G. Wedell, "Broadcasting in the Third World," London, 1977, p 145.
30. Ibid.
31. Rosalind Ainsley, "The Press in Africa," Moscow, 1971, p 287.
32. E. Katz and G. Wedell, Op. cit., p 29.
33. D. S. Komissarov, "Puti razvitiya novoy i noveyshey persidskoy literatury" [Developments in Modern and Contemporary Persian Literature], Moscow, 1981, p 107.
34. Ibid., p 108.
35. J. De Francs, "Colonialism and Language Policy in Viet Nam," The Hague, Mouton, 1977.
36. For a discussion of this aspect of the tendency to politicize languages, see L. B. Nikol'skiy, "Language and the Ideological and Political Struggle (Sociopsychological Premises)," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1981, No 2.

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GRAND BOURGEOISIE IN PRESENT-DAY TURKEY

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[Article by Yu. N. Rozaliyev]

[Text] The process of class formation in Turkey has its distinctive features, although many contemporary social developments in this country can be found in some form in other Eastern states taking a course of bourgeois development. This also applies to the dynamics of the Turkish social-class structure--a matter which was raised in an article by G. I. Starchenkov, who justifiably believes that Turkey "is not a multistructural, but a capitalist country" approaching the "middle level of capitalist development."¹

This process is one of the determining factors of the social structure of society, the status of classes and class substrata, the scales and intensity of class struggle, the domestic and foreign policy of the country and the position of the petty bourgeoisie and petty bourgeois population strata. The process stimulates the determination and persistence with which representatives of big capital defend their interests, the close connection between Turkish big business and transnational corporations, etc. In other words, the status, prospects and developmental characteristics of the present-day Turkish bourgeoisie will depend on the structure of state-monopoly capitalism.

Turkish state-monopoly capitalism is developing at a time when the world capitalist system has entered a period of protracted and severe economic crisis and when imperialism has embarked on overtly aggressive behavior in direct proximity to the country's borders and on the escalation of the arms race. In Turkey itself, however, several sectors of the economy are still severely underdeveloped, demonstrating the effects of the semicolonial past, the consequences of participation in the aggressive NATO bloc and the expansion of military preparations exceeding the country's capabilities. In spite of the accelerated development of state-monopoly capitalism, Turkey is still undergoing a triple process (particularly characteristic of the prewar years): the establishment of "top-level" capitalism, its development "from the bottom up" and its development in the form of state capitalism.² The situation in Turkey appears to be a repetition of the one described by V. I. Lenin in his economic history of Russia in 1851-1905, when old patriarchal structures were collapsing "under the influence of world capitalism,"

"big financial capital, large-scale trade and industry were being developed" and the accelerated "growth of capitalism from the bottom up and its cultivation from the top down" were going on.³ In Turkey this process is even more contradictory and has been a much heavier burden for the broad laboring masses.

Present-day Turkey has substantial material and human resources (its population reached 44.7 million in 1981), industry and agriculture capable of satisfying public needs. Industry (including construction) accounted for 55 percent of the gross product (in 1981), and agriculture accounted for 45 percent. The average annual per capita domestic gross product had already exceeded 1,100 dollars by 1976.⁴ In 1978 there were 370,300 tractors in rural Turkey, cultivating more than 80 percent of all farmland. The average yield of cotton in 1970-1981 was 743 kilograms per hectare, the yield of sugarbeet was 31-34 tons and the yield of grain was 17-18 quintals.⁵

Turkey not only has highly developed food, textile and ceramic industries, but also metallurgical, chemical, machine-assembly, electrical equipment, paper and glass industries and others.⁶ Trade revenues accounted for 14 percent of the domestic national product in 1980 (the usual percentage for a capitalist country). Foreign trade operations accounted for 12-18 percent of the gross national product in 1975-1981, capital investments accounted for 17.8-22.3 percent, the state budget accounted for 18-25 percent, etc.⁷ In terms of basic economic indicators, Turkey belongs to the group of capitalist countries with a middle level of development. Along with this, however, the country is distinguished by mass poverty, a low consumption level of vitally necessary goods, the extremely uneven development of various industries and regions, strong dependence on imperialist monopolies and various forms of neocolonial "aid," dramatic fluctuations in the domestic economic situation, which depends largely on the state of affairs in the Western economy, stagnation and periodic declines in the production of some goods, inflation, a colossal foreign and public debt and a growing deficit in foreign trade operations.

The country's economic difficulties have not, however, kept the income of ruling classes from growing. Only the difficult position of the laboring public and lowest bourgeois strata has deteriorated as a result of these difficulties. The present-day Turkish bourgeoisie still bears the marks of its historical evolution--there are perceptible differences between the bourgeois elite and the large petty and middle strata, which were growing while capitalism was evolving from the barely productive structures of the past. The broadest basis for the growth of the petty bourgeoisie consists in small-scale production and elementary forms of urban enterprise. Prior to the appearance of Turkish monopoly capital and the development of state-monopoly capitalism, the growth of capitalism "from the bottom up" was a relatively independent process, receiving comparatively negligible assistance from the state. After 1950 (when the government was taken over by the Democratic Party, headed by C. Bayar), this process acquired an increasingly close connection with the growth of monopoly capital. It turned out that the sphere of relatively free competition grew smaller and smaller as the monopolies engaged in the increasingly intensive "absorption" of lower forms of enterprise and the subordination of these forms to monopoly interests.⁸

The lowest forms of enterprise are still, however, widespread in Turkey. This is attested to by Turkish statistics, including data on the processing industry. According to these data, there are 175,300 enterprises in all in the country, 4,800 of which are large (2.7 percent of the total) and 170,500 of which are small (employing 10 or less people). Large-scale industry has been responsible for 84 percent of the total industrial product and 88.2 percent of "added value." The average wage at a small enterprise has been less than one-fourth as high as the wage of a worker in a large establishment.⁹ Small-scale production is most prevalent in the footwear, food, wood-processing and textile industries and at metal-working enterprises.

On the whole, the economic processes leading to the constant formation and equally constant demise of the petty bourgeoisie in Turkey are complex and diverse. The largest sphere of small-scale production is still agriculture, where 30 percent of all peasant families own no land and another 53 percent own tiny plots inadequate for their own subsistence.¹⁰ At the same time, agriculture has continued to receive increasingly large quantities of capital, agricultural equipment, fertilizer, herbicides, etc. For example, whereas the number of the notorious "karasapans" (wooden plows) in rural areas decreased from 1.8 million to 1 million just between 1971 and 1978, the number of tractors rose from 118,500 to 370,300, the number of tractor-drawn plows rose from 98,300 to 314,000, the number of threshers rose from 19,300 to 75,800, etc.¹¹ The amount of bank credit extended to agriculture rose from 28.8 billion lira to 47.3 billion between 1974 and 1978.¹² Whereas around 6 million tons of chemical fertilizers were used in 1976, the figure in 1979 was 8.1 million tons.¹³

Some large landowners, who represent only 0.9 percent of the rural population (67,000 people in all) but own more than 11 percent of all the farmland, rent land to peasants on a share-cropping basis, which remains profitable even at a time of constantly rising food prices. Some large landowners engage in intensive capitalist farming, and each had an annual income of at least 100,000 lira in 1977. Another group of businessmen ("owners of capital and equipment") numbers, according to data in the Turkish press, 300,000-400,000 individuals. They lease land, usually from small landowners who are forced to lease by the impossibility of independent farming. The "owners of capital and equipment" now constitute the largest segment of the rural bourgeoisie. The annual income of these individuals totaled around 40,000 lira and naturally could not secure a solid position in the business community. Some of the peasants among the small and minor landowners, who represent around 60 percent of the rural population, have tried to rent land from other small landowners on a monetary or share-cropping basis. This category of peasants is eroding quite quickly. The overwhelming majority are rapidly becoming pre-proletarians, "relieved" of a means of subsistence, land and a roof over their heads, are fleeing to the cities and are augmenting the large army of unemployed. Even according to official data, the proportion accounted for by rural inhabitants in the total population decreased from 61.3 percent to 56.1 percent between 1970 and 1980,¹⁴ and the number of unemployed has now reached 4.5 million, or 18-20 percent of the labor force. Finally, rural big businessmen, who represent 6 percent of the rural population, engage in intensive capitalist farming with the broad-scale use of manpower and technical equipment.

Therefore, capitalism is absolutely dominant in rural Turkey and has established complete jurisdiction over all forms of farming and land use. The further consolidation of agricultural capitalism will be accomplished through the reinforcement of the kulak stratum ("owners of capital and machinery"), previously "well-to-do peasants" who rose from the ranks of relatively small landowners, and through production expansion on the lands of the top bourgeois strata (landowners and entrepreneurs), who made an irrevocable choice in favor of contemporary capitalism long ago.

One of the most widespread occupations of the petty bourgeois individuals operating in agriculture is the dealer in new and second-hand goods (he is also the credit merchant, often a money-lender and small businessman). The existence of a huge stratum of small-scale producers creates a favorable environment for the emergence of this social type. These dealers operate quite successfully in regions where commercial crops are produced (cotton, tobacco, grapes, walnuts, olives, etc.). As a rule, the state agricultural purchasing system operates in close connection only with large suppliers and merchants having a large, well-organized and well-informed staff of agents dealing directly with producers. These same agents profit handsomely from deliveries of "city" goods to rural areas.

The petty bourgeoisie tends to be subordinate to big capital under the conditions of increasingly strong national monopolies. The relatively small middle bourgeoisie (owners of small factories, machine repair shops and trade firms, merchant entrepreneurs who exploit tens and hundreds of home-workers, the middlemen of large firms, etc.) is often defeated in competition with big capital and imperialist monopolies.¹⁵ According to newspaper reports, for example, around 100 firms went bankrupt in Turkey in 1980, but 2,330 small industrial and trade companies ceased to exist in 1981 when they could not survive the competition of large monopolistic associations. In 1981 alone, the total number of protested bills rose by 20.7 percent and amounted to 136.8 billion lira.¹⁶

Despite the increasing subordination of small capital to big business and the deterioration of business conditions for the petty bourgeoisie, many of its members still have not lost their illusions about the possibility of "correcting the situation" and their belief that business conditions for small capital will improve as soon as the state "assists" them by giving them more credit, fertilizer, machines, spare parts and so forth, stopping inflation, "regulating the economy," "putting things in order," etc. These illusions are fueled by memories of the "recent" past, when there was "more freedom" in Turkey and "everything was better"--that is, when the quickly increasing strength and pressure of monopoly capital, which had been given considerable support by imperialism and transnational corporations, were still not apparent.

The elite of Turkish capital is the grand, primarily monopolistic bourgeoisie, a small group of individuals (no more than 1,000) who control the decisive levers of economic strength and political power. This bourgeoisie is extremely well organized, well educated (its members are generally educated in Europe and the United States), well known even outside the country, energetic,

enterprising, supremely selfish, sly and resourceful. Its main goals and demands are the freedom of private enterprise, the best possible conditions for maximum profits, alliance with the imperialist West, the use of the experience, achievements and ideas of the capitalist "community" of developed countries for the reinforcement of its own influence and organizations in Turkish business, and the creation of the most favorable conditions for successful competition with highly developed capitalist production in Europe and the United States. The grand bourgeoisie coins nationalist and chauvinist slogans and makes references to the ideas and statements of K. Ataturk to conceal its own aims and objectives.

The economic influence of the grand bourgeoisie stems from the operational scales of national joint-stock capital (primarily "holding companies"), which has merged with banking capital and the capital of state societies and organizations. Around 6,000 joint-stock companies are now operating in the country and control most of the product of the chief industries and a significant portion of agriculture, credit, insurance and domestic and foreign trade. The joint-stock societies are dominated by a few banks and joint-stock companies (around 3 percent of all the societies), which account for 80-85 percent of all company assets and a corresponding share of profits. Banking is dominated by three banks--the Commercial Bank, Commercial and Credit Bank and Akbank--controlling a total of around 75 percent of all national banking assets. The Commercial Bank, with some of its assets belonging to the treasury and the Republican People's Party, play the leading role in the development of joint-stock capital. For a long time, this bank was headed by C. Bayar, the former president of Turkey. The bank heads the well-known "Commercial Bank Group" uniting around 80 joint-stock companies.

The close interaction of private and state capital and of Turkish and foreign capital is a common feature of many joint-stock societies. The ownership of a company by one of these groups of capital, however, is not determined only by the proportional participation of the bank and joint-stock companies of the particular group, but also by mutual chairmanships, the credit of leading societies, interaction with production, etc.

Several of the companies founded by the Commercial Bank have turned into monopolistic organizations controlling 20-25 affiliates and subaffiliates. For example, one of the first monopolistic societies, a Turkish sugar refinery company, made its appearance even before World War II and was founded as a joint-stock company with equal participation by the private Commercial Bank, the state Cumerbank and the Agricultural Bank. Later, this company, in conjunction with private societies, the Commercial Bank, state banks (Cumerbank, Etibank, the Agricultural Bank and others) and cooperatives and semistate-owned corporations, established a strong network of joint-stock companies (around 25 societies) for the complete control of this industry. Similar processes were observed in the cement, metallurgical, petroleum refining, textile, glass and electric equipment industries and others.¹⁷

Numerous facts from the history of Turkish business testify that the emergence of state-monopoly capitalism in Turkey differed from the history of this process in the developed capital countries in one important respect: The

formation of monopolies and financial capital, the interaction of monopoly and state capital and the appearance of private-state-foreign corporations controlling a diversified network of affiliates and subaffiliates with the participation of cooperatives and other societies did not follow the classic sequence but were virtually simultaneous.

In 1950 (when the Democratic Party took power), conditions in Turkey were favorable for the rapid establishment of financial capital and industrial-financial corporations; these were formed immediately with the participation of state and foreign capital, demonstrating their close interaction. Financial concentration was often far ahead of industrial concentration and was the leading factor in the formation of monopolies. There was a similar situation in V. I. Lenin's time, when he wrote that financial concentration "can and does strengthen the omnipotence of monopoly capital when technical equipment is still backward."¹⁸ It was precisely this process that was characteristic of Turkey.

After entering into an economic and political alliance with imperialism, the top strata of the Turkish bourgeoisie received extensive assistance and support from the government and tried to master the modern organizational structures of developed capitalism with the support of their Western partners. As a result, state-monopoly capitalism came into being under the conditions of general underdevelopment and the incomplete "natural" maturation of monopoly capitalism from the lowest forms of enterprise, where petty capitalist forms constitute the absolute majority. There is no question that this will continue to be the situation for many years.

The history of Turkish state-monopoly capitalism corroborates V. I. Lenin's idea that "the development of capitalism in young countries is accelerated considerably by the example and assistance of old countries."¹⁹

The position of the present-day grand bourgeoisie rests on the strength of 25-30 monopolistic corporations, each of which controls 30-50 or more affiliates. The interests of these corporations are closely intermeshed with the interests of the country's largest banks. These monopolistic groups constitute the most influential segment of the grand bourgeoisie. They include the Commercial Bank, Commercial and Credit Bank, Akbank, the Guaranty Bank and the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey. They control over 90 percent of all credit operations and receive more than 95 percent of all bank profits. The banks "specialize" in serving various groups of monopoly capital. The Commercial Bank accounts for around 40 percent of all the assets, deposits, credit operations, participation in joint-stock societies and capital investments of private banks. Akbank is the head bank of the H. O. Sabanci Holding conglomerate and primarily serves the companies making up this monopolistic alliance. The controlling stock in the Guaranty Bank is owned by V. Koc, the head of Koc Holding, the strongest monopoly in Turkey. The Commercial and Credit Bank is part of the rapidly growing Cukurova Holding corporation. The Industrial Development Bank of Turkey is a mixed private-state-foreign company through which Turkish monopoly capital receives credit and support from international corporations. Other private banks (around 30 in all) either specialize in a particular field (for example, the sugar, tea, merchant marine,

tourist and tobacco banks and so forth) or have a relatively small commercial-middleman operational volume.

The major corporations heading specific groups of companies include V. Koc Holding, H. O. Sabanci Holding, Oyak Holding, Ecacibasi Yatirim Holding, Transturk Holding and so forth, as well as private and semistate corporations--the Turkish Sugar Refinery Company, the Turkish Cement Industry, the Eregli Metallurgical Plant Company, the Turkish Department Store Company, the Joint-Stock Glass Industry Company and others. The most prominent businessmen in present-day Turkey are the Koc, Sabanci and Sapmazov families, K. Tashkent, H. Alisbah, N. A. Kuyucak, B. Nahoum, N. Dagdelen, D. Yasar, C. Selek, F. Ecacibasi, E. Burla and others. According to our calculations, based on official statistics, the largest monopolistic organizations represent around 3 percent of all joint-stock companies but account for 85 percent or more of the income of all Turkish companies. Their annual profits are equivalent to 60-120 percent of society capital. The strength of the leading group of capital is attested to by the fact that the total assets of the country's 100 largest companies in 1975 were equivalent to 68 percent of the Turkish state budget (in current prices).²⁰ According to reports in the American press, the most profitable Turkish "conglomerate" (or concern) is the V. Koc group, the assets of which exceeded 1.128 billion dollars in 1977, with an income of 103 million dollars. According to the Turkish press, BUSINESS WEEK magazine included this concern among the 13 most profitable companies in the world and the 5 most profitable societies in Europe.²¹

The major Turkish corporations in 1980 included Cukurova Holding (provisional sales of 188.2 billion lira and a net profit of 6.7 billion lira), Sabanci Holding (184 billion and 11.2 billion), Koc Holding (163.7 billion and 9.8 billion), Transturk Holding (37.6 billion and 1.9 billion), Ecacibasi Holding (25 billion and 2.5 billion), etc. The provisional sales of the 10 largest societies totaled 678.1 billion lira and their total profits were 41.8 billion lira. The strongest private banks in 1980 were still the Commercial Bank (865 branches throughout the country, 19,300 employees and 7 million operations a year), Akbank (respective figures of 585; 9,900; 2.4 million), the Commercial and Credit Bank (577; 10,100; 2.6 million), the Guaranty Bank (271; 8,800; 1.3 million), etc.²² According to the calculations of Turkish economists and reports in the press, the processing industry has been monopolized to a greater degree in Turkey than in such countries as England, France and even the United States.²³

Turkish monopolies crossed national boundaries long ago. For example the Commercial Bank has branches in Cyprus, the FRG and other countries. Turkish capital is now represented not only in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq and Pakistan, but also in Switzerland, Sweden, England, France and other countries. State banks play an important role in the system of Turkish state-monopoly capitalism. Their assets constitute around 60 percent of all bank assets. But these data are approximate at best. The fact is that state banks (the Agricultural Bank, Cumerbank, Etibank and others) not only conduct banking operations but also finance and control their own enterprises. As a result, the banking activity of state banks is only partially reflected in their balance sheets, although their total assets are substantial as a result of secondary

indicators. Nevertheless, state banks play an important role in Turkish business. Many large and major companies have not only been founded with the assistance of the government, but have also operated with the active participation of the state, which has guaranteed stockholders high profits, has supplied private and semistate societies with plans, technical documents, crude resources and auxiliary materials and has supported them when their positions have been weakened and when they have faced the threat of bankruptcy. As a result, private capital has been able, even with relatively small investments according to the laws of participation in joint-stock companies, to control state funds and use them in its own interests, to put its representatives in important administrative positions, to derive new profits and to obtain large loans from the state and from foreign sources on convenient terms. For example, the total credit extended by the Turkish Central Bank to the private sector increased from 23 billion lira to 377.2 billion between 1974 and 1981 and represented 32-41 percent of all the credit extended by this semistate-semiprivate establishment. But this was not all. The credit extended to state societies in 1979 included subsidies paid to such semistate-semiprivate corporations as the Turkish Sugar Refinery Company (15.5 billion lira), the Turkish Cement Company (99 million lira) and others.²⁴

When state sector activity is being analyzed, the following facts must also be taken into account: state capital investments (around 50 percent of all investments) were channeled primarily into railway transport, communications, military production, the extractive industry, power engineering, public health, education and other spheres requiring large capital investments. On the other hand, the most profitable industries, producing the highest return on investments and accounting for 70-80 percent of the total value of the industrial product, were dominated by private capital. Finally, the activities of state-private companies contributed to the formation of monopolistic conglomerates with the participation of foreign capital. For example, the stock in one of the largest corporations--the Eregli Metallurgical Combine--has been distributed among the government state banks and organizations, private individuals (including V. Koc) and the Commercial Bank on the one hand and American, English and French firms on the other. When the company was formed, the society's joint-stock capital amounted to a relatively small sum (around 100 million lira). Participation by the state and by foreign societies, however, helped the company receive large loans from the Treasury, from state banks and from foreign banks and corporations. As a result, it became one of the strongest and most profitable societies in 1975 (1.3 billion lira in capital, an income of 275 million lira, 9,000 employees and 3.5 billion lira in working capital).²⁵ A similar process occurred in the case of the Army Assistance Society ("Ordu yardim korumu"--OYK), the joint-stock capital of which originally consisted of 10-percent deductions from the salary of Turkish Army officers. After receiving huge loans from several American companies, the IBRD, the government and government organizations and after establishing direct contact and organizing "joint activity" with the Commercial Bank, Commercial and Credit Bank, Koc Holding, O. Sabanci Holding and other conglomerates, the society turned into one of Turkey's largest monopolies, controlling the country's military-industrial complex.²⁶

Under the conditions of the close intermingling of state and private capital, their interaction with invariable advantages for the private sector and the

extensive use of government funds by monopolies, we could not say that the "state sector is being absorbed" by private capital. In our opinion, Turkish monopoly capital has an incentive to maintain the state sector and even to enlarge and reinforce it for the even broader support of big capital.

The reinforcement of the economic influence of top strata of the monopolistic bourgeoisie and the formation of state-monopoly capitalism were accompanied by increasing political influence by monopoly representatives on the government and the suppression of the struggle by the working class and all laborers against the onslaught of big capital. Between 1946, when the Democratic Party was formed (it came to power in 1950), and 1960 the party leadership promoted and defended the interests of the grand bourgeoisie, monopoly capital and pro-imperialist groups in the country. The openly pro-monopoly policy of the Bayar-Menderes Government led to widespread discontent on the part of the laboring public (the proletariat, the petty and middle bourgeoisie and the peasantry) and the sharp exacerbation of domestic political problems. After the coup d'etat in May 1960, when General C. Gursel took power, the authorities tried to restrict the freedom of big capital and the monopolies and reduce their political influence. Imperialist circles in the West, especially the United States, were upset by these anti-monopoly measures and used every form of economic, political, diplomatic and military pressure to influence the new government. Representatives of the Turkish monopolistic bourgeoisie, who had established diversified contacts with imperialism, the army elite and the officer corps, also became more active. It was at this time that prominent capitalist V. Koc, K. Tashkent and B. Yazici were instrumental in the founding of the OYK, which has now become one of the country's largest monopolistic corporations.²⁷ It was through the OYK that the Turkish officers began to communicate directly with business and, to put it simply, were bought by financial capital. The events of the late 1970's are another example of the Turkish grand bourgeoisie's omnipotence. In January 1979, acting on the instructions of the IMF, representatives of Turkish monopolies resolved to "liberalize the economy," a plan which envisaged the "improvement" of big business by means of the further concentration of capital, the offer of privileges and benefits to monopolies by the government, the attraction of foreign capital to the country, a wage freeze, the prohibition of strikes and free labor union activity, etc. At that time, however, the Demirel Government was unable to carry out this decision. The military elite then became involved in the situation, just as it had in the past. In September 1980 the leadership of the armed forces took control of the government. Strikes were prohibited, democratic labor organizations were dissolved, mass arrests were conducted (in all, by the beginning of 1983, 200,000 fighters for working class interests had been imprisoned, 47,000 had been tried by a military court and 3,500 had been sentenced to death), and even the leaders of bourgeois parties were taken "under army protection" and were forbidden to engage in any kind of political activity. The alignment of class and political forces in Turkey did not change, but the suppression of democratic organizations became more pronounced. The military preserved the entire system of state-monopoly capitalism. What is more, big private capital began to enjoy even broader government support and the profits of the leading corporations rose.²⁸ The new constitution of November 1982 limits the right of workers to strike and to establish free trade unions and their own political organizations. This is

completely consistent with monopoly interests. Under these new economic and political conditions, state-monopoly capitalism in Turkey will turn into a military-bureaucratic system. The exacerbation of contradictions in the development of this form of capitalism is inevitable.

FOOTNOTES

1. G. I. Starchenkov, "The Dynamics of the Turkish Social-Class Structure," *NARODY AZII I AFRIKI*, 1982, No 4, p 92.
2. For a more detailed discussion, see Yu. N. Rozaliyev, "Osobennosti razvitiya kapitalizma v Turtsii" [Distinctive Features of the Development of Capitalism in Turkey], Moscow, 1962; Yu. N. Rozaliyev, "Ekonomicheskaya istoriya Turetskoy Respubliki" [The Economic History of the Republic of Turkey], Moscow, 1980; Yu. N. Rozaliyev, "State Capitalism and the Developing Economy," *NARODY AZII I AFRIKI*, 1980, No 1.
3. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 20, pp 38-39.
4. *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA Y MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA*, 1979, No 5, pp 149, 152; "Iktisadi rapor. 1980" [Economic Review], Ankara, 1980, p 15.
5. "Tarim istatistikleri ozeti" [Bulletin of Agricultural Statistics], Ankara, 1979, pp 11-15; "Iktisadi rapor. 1982," p 55.
6. "Durduncu bes yillik kalkinma plani (1979-1983)" [The Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1979-1983)], Ankara, 1980.
7. "Iktisadi rapor. 1980," pp 335-370; "Iktisadi rapor. 1982." p 170; "The Turkish Economy. 1982," Istanbul, 1982, p 11.
8. For a more detailed discussion, see Yu. N. Rozaliyev, "Ekonomicheskaya istoriya Turetskoy Respubliki," pp 144-147; Yu. N. Rozaliyev, "Klassy i klassovaya bor'ba v Turtsii (burzhuaziya i proletariat)" [Classes and Class Struggle in Turkey (The Bourgeoisie and the Proletariat)], Moscow, 1966, pp 53-104.
9. Calculated according to "Istatistik yilligi. 1979" [Statistical Almanac], Ankara, 1979, p 217.
10. "Politika i ekonomika sovremennoy Turtsii" [Politics and Economics in Present-Day Turkey], Moscow, 1977, p 201.
11. "Istatistik yilligi. 1979," p 186.
12. "Iktisadi rapor. 1979," p 136.
13. "Iktisadi rapor. 1980," p 74.

14. "Iktisadi rapor. 1982," p 34.
15. For a more detailed discussion, see Yu. N. Rozaliyev, "Ekonomicheskaya istoriya Turetskoy Respubliki," pp 253-256.
16. PRAVDA, 22 June 1981; 18 February 1982; "Iktisadi rapor. 1982," pp 115-116.
17. For more detail, see Yu. N. Rozaliyev, "Ekonomicheskaya istoriya Turetskoy Respubliki," pp 195-217.
18. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., Vol 28, p 171.
19. Ibid., Vol 3, p 490.
20. "Turkey. An Economic Survey," Ankara, 1977, p 25; "Iktisadi rapor. 1980," p 334.
21. MILLIYET, 27 January 1977; TERCUMAN, 19 July 1978.
22. CUMHURIYET, 4 June 1981.
23. Ibid., 8, 9, 10 March 1982.
24. "Iktisadi rapor. 1980," pp 321-326; "Iktisadi rapor. 1982," p 160.
25. "Turkey. An Economic Survey," p 24.
26. CUNAYDIN, 23 February, 31 March 1978; IKA, 16 March 1978; YANKI, November 1979, p 29.
27. Vehbi Koc, "Hayat Hikayem" [My Life], Istanbul, 1973, p 112.
28. CUMHURIYET, 2 December 1981; "The Turkish Economy. 1982," pp 44-47.

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'CRISIS' IN THIRD-WORLD REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS VIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 83 pp 107-112

[Article by T. A. Karlova: "Cooperation by Developing Countries in Integration"]

[Excerpt] Here we would like to point out one of the reasons for the critical state of regional integration in the developing world--the incompatibility of chosen forms of cooperation, which are essentially copies of Western "integration models," with the goals and objectives of most developing countries.

The viability of regional integrative cooperation now depends largely on the guidelines and methods chosen. The present state and future prospects of regional integration can be most accurately assessed only on the basis of a comprehensive study of its working, driving forces and internal processes. There are more than 20 alternative forms and fields of integrative cooperation. Virtually all associations have their own specific features, stemming from the diversity of conditions in the developing countries. There are two main fields of integration--markets and production. In addition, another field is significant--integration in the infrastructure.

Monetary cooperation probably does not warrant special consideration. It is one of the relatively developed forms of regional cooperation in the developing world. Virtually all regional systems have their own credit and payment institutions.¹ But most of these organizations--for example, ASEAN's Financial Corporation and "Swap" Agreement, the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development and similar CEAO (West African Economic Community) funds--were created as organizations to aid in the fulfillment of regional programs of cooperation only in specific spheres, which underscored their auxiliary, functional nature. On the other hand, some regional development banks are closely connected with the IBRD and do represent the interests of foreign capital in the developing countries, promoting an emphasis on exports. Under these conditions, this should not be viewed as some kind of monetary integration by the developing countries themselves, but as one way of securing their neocolonial dependence on imperialism.

Let us take a closer look at the different forms of integration.

Market integration: Virtually all regional associations in the developing world have worked toward market integration to some degree. On the whole, the evolution of market forms of integration could be described as a move "from the complex to the simple," as there was an initial tendency to take on ambitious programs for the rapid (within 15-20 years) creation of regional common markets (commodity, capital and manpower). But market integration actually did not progress any further than the partial liberalization of reciprocal trade. This was an extremely slow process, encompassing (as in the case of ASEAN, for example) a negligible part of the total stock of commodities, and in some cases it did not lead to the anticipated growth of mutual commodity exchange. Market integration in the developing countries did not create the kind of zones of free trade and common markets which are characteristic of developed capitalist states, but zones of preferential trade. Steps were taken toward their creation by 16 regional associations of developing countries. The liberalization within these preferential trade zones included the coordination of product lists subject to liberalization, the elaboration of mutual concession tactics and the elaboration of regional policy on non-tariff concessions (the terminology used here and in the rest of the article is UNCTAD's).

The coordination of product lists involved the use of such instruments as a temporary "freeze" on all commercial tariffs (ECOWAS); the linear reduction of tariffs--most often with the exception of commodities included on reserve lists or in the presence of special protectionist taxes; the liberalization of specific commodities with limits on maximum import value (ASEAN); the coordination of commercial positions according to general and national lists, accompanied by sectorial liberalization within the framework of "intersupplementary agreements" or "partial (factional) agreements." In addition, several associations have used different combinations of these instruments (ASEAN and ECOWAS). A mechanism of reciprocal tariff concessions has been worked out by determining tariff limits or discounts (for example, in ASEAN) and tariff reductions (in the majority of groups). Efforts to coordinate product lists and to cancel non-tariff restrictions in mutual trade were made in ECOWAS and other associations. In addition to these existing liberalization programs, several integrative alliances have envisaged special preferential terms for the least developed countries. For example, in Africa such systems have been adopted in ECOWAS.

In addition to the preferential trade zones, another form of market integration has been used widely in the developing countries--customs unions. The need for this kind of cooperation has been stipulated in recent ECOWAS and ASEAN documents. A common foreign tariff has been negotiated, and efforts have been made to institute it in such groups as CEA0. The variety of forms and instruments of market integration in the developing countries is quite broad. What is the reason for this? In countries with a relatively high level of economic development, the rapid growth of productive forces inevitably gives rise to a conflict between growing production and the national market's insufficient capacity for absorption. As a result, the markets of neighboring states must be penetrated and a regional market must be formed. Some examples of this were Kenya in WAS, Nigeria in ECOWAS and Singapore in ASEAN. These countries see market integration as the main area of regional cooperation and strive to impose it on their weaker partners.

In the less developed countries, the choice of market forms is limited by the following factors:

A high level of dependence on foreign markets due to the emphasis on exports in their economy;

The resulting close dependence on developed capitalist states, which often promote market integration and try to use it in their own interests;

The choice of the wrong approach in the hope of immediate advantages: In many associations it was assumed that the growth of reciprocal trade would stimulate the development of national industry, secure additional financial resources from foreign sources, reduce dependence on developed capitalist states and eventually lead to higher rates of independent economic development;

The accessibility of market forms of integration requiring no large capital investments.

What are the actual results of market integration in the developing countries? In several associations the commencement of customs liberalization was accompanied by somewhat livelier reciprocal trade and even by its considerable growth. In the case of ASEAN, for example, intraregional trade more than doubled between 1975 and 1980.² Trade grew constantly in several African associations (for example, the annual growth rate of reciprocal trade after 1975 in ECOWAS and CEAQ was 2 percent and 9 percent respectively).³ These data, however, certainly cannot be regarded as proof of the effectiveness of market integration in the stimulation of economic development in these countries. In the first place, they are not indicative enough in themselves. In ASEAN, for example, many of the commodities registered in regional trade markets pass through Singapore in transit and are re-exported to third countries. In the second place, reciprocal trade still accounts for a small part of the overall turnover of the majority of integrative alliances. At the end of the 1970's, for example, the indicator in ASEAN was 14 percent.⁴ It is interesting that liberalization affected only 3 percent of the reciprocal trade of the ASEAN countries. This testifies that the growth of regional trade has not been due mainly to integration efforts.

Finally, the growth of regional trade has not been accompanied by improvements in the patterns of its distribution among countries and commodity groups. On the contrary, the cancellation of tariff and non-tariff restrictions created greater disparities in reciprocal trade under the effects of the law of international value and international production prices, as a result of which the more developed countries earned additional profits. One indicator of this process is the appearance of chronic deficits in the balance of trade of some countries, and this has particularly been witnessed in the West African community and was one of the reasons for its disintegration. Therefore, although market integration has stimulated the growth of reciprocal trade, it has also given rise to several conflicts between participants in regional cooperation and has slowed down this process to some extent.

Production integration: In recent years the need for a comprehensive approach to the choice of regional integration methods has been acknowledged more and more readily in the developing countries. The documents of several integrative alliances state that although trade is an important instrument of co-operation, it should nevertheless play a subordinate role to the development of the production potential of participating countries. Attempts to organize production cooperation were made in 10 associations of developing countries. As a result, some experience was accumulated in such fields as the coordination of industrial and agrarian policy, the organized exchange of information and related scientific research findings, production specialization and co-operation, and the coordination of investment policy and practices in relations with foreign capital.

The following instruments are used in these fields of production cooperation:

The compilation of comprehensive programs for agricultural development and industrialization, including systems for the exchange of information, scientific research and personnel training (ASEAN and ECOWAS). The elaboration of a regional agricultural policy was also attempted in eight associations;

The compilation of sectorial and intersectorial industrial programs based on industrial specialization (ASEAN);

The creation of multinational regional enterprises (MRE's), especially in the private sector;

Indirect means of stimulating industrial cooperation through a system of sectorial and commercial customs liberalization;

The elaboration of regional investment schedules and programs (ASEAN and ECOWAS).

Despite this great variety of forms of production cooperation, no association has accumulated enough experience to indicate any perceptible success in this area. On the contrary, the developing countries' first efforts to organize industrial specialization and cooperation on the regional level proved that this process can entail as many difficulties and conflicts as the liberalization of reciprocal trade. These difficulties are connected primarily with differing levels of industrial development or industrial potential in the participating countries and with the resulting differences in the "acceptance potential" of various countries in the region. As a result, the distribution of integrative production units, which represents another facet of the old problem of integration "profit and loss distribution," becomes an even more urgent matter. Another problem is the need to increase the capacity of the entire regional market, which cannot absorb enough of the products of large modern chemical or machine-building enterprises. Another problem is the lack of a comprehensive approach to cooperation in the production sphere. Several agreements do not include the machinery for the industrial planning and distribution of products and essentially represent an attempt to stimulate the development of individual industries by means of customs disarmament. The five ASEAN industrial cooperation projects instituted in 1976 were not planned

carefully enough from the standpoint of the effective use of regional market demands and resources. As a result, some of these projects had to be abandoned and others are still in the development stage.

Infrastructural forms: Many regional groups of developing countries are not capable of carrying out broad-scale comprehensive programs of production integration. This applies above all to the associations in Tropical Africa. The idea of "sequential integration" has grown increasingly popular in recent years. A new form of regional integrative cooperation has appeared--united efforts to develop the infrastructure. In our opinion, these infrastructural forms of integration have developed according to two basic patterns. In the first case, states form alliances for the collective exploitation of natural resources or the development of transportation, power engineering and other elements of the infrastructure in the basins of large rivers and lakes. There are 15 such associations with cooperation programs of varying scales in the developing countries at the present time. In the other case, the appropriate elements are included in more general integration programs (in ECOWAS and ASEAN, for example). Several alliances have displayed a tendency to form stable multilateral economic ties. The Lake Chad basin commission and the Senegal River development organization are examples of such alliances. These associations have demonstrated their viability. Regional cooperation is developing quickly within the Senegal River organization, formed in 1972. The countries belonging to this association began the construction of two large dams in recent years. They are to be used as the basis for future hydro-electric power stations, which should solve many of the subregion's energy problems. A transport infrastructure is to be (or is already being) created simultaneously with the work on these projects. Irrigation in the river basin should considerably augment agricultural development potential, and this will improve the population's food supply.

It is unlikely that infrastructural forms of integration can be judged only on the basis of declared goals. Furthermore, the development of these alliances is being impeded by insufficient financing, which comes mainly from the developed capitalist states. The measures taken by these associations, however, essentially lay a tangible foundation for a subsequent transition to broad-scale regional programs--in industry or agriculture, for example. The legal institutional structure of integration processes also takes shape within these associations. In our opinion, all of this makes cooperation in the infrastructure an independent form of integration. In such associations as ECOWAS, ASEAN and others, the special programs drawn up for the infrastructure enjoy "equal rights" with cooperation programs in industry, trade, etc.

In summation, it must be said that in spite of the great variety of forms of regional integration in the developing countries, the prevailing form at present is market integration, which is mainly reflected in the creation of preferential trade zones. Market integration can stimulate the growth of reciprocal trade, but as long as it is the sole or prevailing form of regional cooperation it does not correspond to the development objectives of developing countries for the following reasons:

It does not mobilize natural, human and financial resources for the development of industry, agriculture, transportation, science, education, etc.;

It does not solve the problem of dependence on developed capitalist states because it does not include mechanisms for the regulation of relations with foreign capital, particularly the transnational corporations;

It exacerbates, and does not eliminate, the problem of inequality, and this eventually weakens the movement for regional cooperation.

Production integration is not enough to make partners equal and it consequently cannot automatically secure the stability of the integrative association. Its effectiveness (that is, its correspondence to the goals of integration) depends on the set of instruments corresponding most fully to the socioeconomic conditions of the group of countries concerned. Production cooperation programs can be made comprehensive by the inclusion of mechanisms and instruments for the planning and distribution of all factors of production and consumption, the institution of a single investment policy and the pursuit of a consistent policy on foreign capital.

Integrative cooperation in the infrastructure is a promising form of regional integration. This kind of cooperation is particularly significant for the least developed countries. As we know, these countries cannot participate in regional alliances on an equal footing with their more developed partners because of their severely underdeveloped transportation, communications and other elements of the production and non-production infrastructure. The material prerequisites and the legal institutional basis for the further development of economic integration in these regions take shape under the influence of this form of cooperation.

When we assess the developmental prospects of forms of regional integration in the developing countries, we can say that all of the forms mentioned in this report will most likely continue to be developed within the regional associations. The choice of guidelines will depend on actual socioeconomic conditions in the countries and the related objectives of integration in each specific group.

FOOTNOTES

1. In accordance with the UNCTAD system of classification, monetary cooperation in the developing countries takes two basic forms: credit-finance institutions and payment agreements (clearing, payment and currency unions).
2. MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS, 1982, No 7.
3. ECONOMIST, 5 June 1982.
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PAKISTANI DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 83 pp 113-119

[Article by S. N. Kamenev]

[Excerpt] By the beginning of the 1970's Pakistan had made no visible progress in its economic development. In addition to the high growth rates of the social product and the main sectors of the national economy, there was a rise in the accumulation norm (from 5 percent in the first half of the 1950's to 16 percent by 1970), a lower proportional share of private and state consumption in the final product, a rise in the overall economic effectiveness of national production, etc.¹⁶ But the unstable and fragmented Pakistani socioeconomic structure was still extremely vulnerable to the effects of foreign and domestic factors and had great difficulty in adapting to the new conditions of self-development. When the conditions of national economic development in the 1970's are examined from this vantage point, it is difficult to imagine a situation less conducive to economic and social growth. The negative effects of weather conditions (floods in 1973, 1975 and 1976 and a drought in 1974) slowed down the rate of reproduction in agriculture. When the Z. A. Bhutto government was in power (1972-1977), added value in this economic sector increased at a rate of just over 2 percent a year, and this signified, just as it did in the 1950's (population increase of 3 percent a year),¹⁷ a decline in per capita agricultural production. The energy and currency crisis of the early 1970's led to a situation in which Pakistan, which was already firmly within the orbit of the world capitalist economy and international division of labor, had to use much of its reserve currency to buy petroleum and petroleum products. It is also indicative that the very process of the institution of economic reforms and the radical revision of economic policy is often accompanied by lower rates of economic growth, lower production efficiency and a lower return on capital. This is why a temporary recession or even stagnation could have been anticipated under these conditions.

What was going on in the social sphere at that time?

During the economic development of the 1970's the national income of Pakistan rose from 30 billion rupees in 1970 to 46 billion in 1980 in constant prices. This means that the per capita monthly income rose from 42 rupees to 47 over this decade. It is significant, however, that these average figures conceal inequities in income distribution. In the first half of the 1970's the majority of the economists set the "poverty level" at 30 rupees and reported that almost one-fourth of the population (!) had a monthly income below this level. Most of the poorest wage earners were small landowners, sharecroppers and craftsmen. In the territorial respect, these social groups were mainly located in North and Northeast Punjab (where relative agrarian resettlement is quite high), the North West frontier and some parts of Sindhi.¹⁸

By the middle of the 1970's the minimum subsistence level rose (in line with rising prices) to 55 rupees in rural areas and 70 in the cities. This meant that around 30 percent of the population had an income below this level. In 1980 the Islamabad newspaper MUSLIM reported: "There are no national income distribution statistics for recent years because no sample surveys were conducted. According to experts, however, by the end of the 1970's around 45 percent of the population (!) lived below the poverty level."¹⁹

Interesting data on the concentration of wealth within the hands of a few are cited by Pakistani economist M. H. Khan. According to the 1972 agricultural census data he uses, 43 percent of all the peasant farms of less than 3 hectares control 12 percent of all the cultivated land, while 3 percent of the farms (of over 12 hectares) control 24 percent. In spite of the agrarian reform of 1972 and the other reform which was started but not completed in 1977, the inequitable distribution of land became more pronounced. By the end of the 1970's, 71 percent of the farms already measured around 2.5 hectares, accounting for 25 percent of all cultivated land, while 1.5 percent of the farms (of over 20 hectares) accounted for 23 percent of all this land.²⁰ Furthermore, according to W. P. Zingel, the official data M. Khan used understate the unequal distribution of wealth.²¹

The rapid development of inflation had much to do with the increasing inequities in income distribution in rural areas and particularly in cities. The rapidly rising prices of consumer goods in the 1970's under the influence of the rise of world prices as a result of the energy and monetary crises, the issuance of surplus currency and other factors, naturally had the strongest effect on the status of the poorest population strata.

Besides this, social conflicts connected with the continued development of capitalist relations became prominent in the last decade (particularly in rural areas). Whereas the growth of agricultural production and the "green revolution" of the 1960's meant that much of the rapidly growing population could be absorbed by this traditional sector (where the number of part-time laborers was rising), the continuous development of capitalist relations in agriculture in the 1970's inhibited this process. The "green revolution" gradually disrupted traditional rural relations in Pakistan, in which financial support had been given to rural groups losing part or all of their means of subsistence, and also lowered the demand for live labor in agriculture. The result was the increased migration of manpower from Pakistan primarily to the Muslim oil-producing countries of the Middle East.

This is why the efforts of ruling circles to secure balanced growth in the 1970's (that is, the optimal balance of economic and social objectives) failed. The government, which had begun to play a perceptibly more important role when Z. A. Bhutto was in power, could not regulate social conflicts.

Strictly speaking, the setting of socioeconomic priorities in countries on the periphery of the world capitalist economy (and Pakistan is one of these countries) is not a simple matter at all. Economic and social evolution in underdeveloped capitalist society is extremely contradictory and progress has been made only in a few areas; this means that specific sectors or spheres of production, regions and so forth make breakthroughs, and far ahead of all the rest. Large sums are often allocated for their development from the relatively limited total resources of these countries. This was the case, for example, in the first half of the 1960's, when auxiliary branches of heavy industry began to develop so rapidly; it was the case in the second half of the 1960's and in the 1970's, when agriculture became a more capital-intensive sector than before under the influence of the "green revolution." This actually led to the addition of new and sometimes almost insurmountable forms of inequality in addition to the already existing social and economic forms, and thereby caused an overall increase in societal inequities.

Whereas the reaction of the developing world as a whole to these processes consisted in stronger egalitarian tendencies in the 1970's, as well as the elaboration (and later the adoption) of various theories aimed at the partial eradication of social-property differences (theories about the satisfaction of "basic needs," "collective self-reliance" and so forth), in Pakistan the egalitarian ideas were only declared in official documents at best. Accelerated agricultural growth (at least an average of 6 percent a year) was the primary objective stipulated in the fifth 5-year plan (1978-1983), and it was noted that "this will be necessary for the satisfaction of basic needs."²² But this was totally inconsistent with the sectorial distribution of government investments: Expenditures on agriculture ranked fifth after allocations for power engineering, transport and communications, industry, and irrigation;²³ the proportion accounted for by these expenditures (10.1 percent) remained virtually on the same level as in previous years. The Zia-ul-Haq government's decision to cancel government fertilizer trade subsidies in the beginning of 1982 and the institution of the Islamic "ush'r" tax in spring 1983 (virtually the entire rural population of Pakistan must pay this tax) certainly did not promote agricultural growth or the satisfaction of basic needs.²⁴

The change of regimes in July 1977, when the government was taken over by top military commanders, was accompanied by changes in economic policy. Ruling circles wanted to balance the development of the public and private sectors, with an emphasis on the latter; it was granted greater opportunities and privileges from year to year. The foundation for this policy was laid in fall 1977 when the flour mills and rice refineries were denationalized. Private businessmen were then given a chance to invest capital in several sectors from which they had previously been barred. Ruling circles then announced the transfer of more than 30 previously nationalized enterprises in 10 major industries to the private sector. Furthermore, in an attempt

to underscore the change in the correlation of the two elements of this "mixed economy" in favor of private enterprise, Zia-ul-Haq stated at a 1981 conference on economic development that the state sector would not compete with the private sector, but would simply supplement it. These measures are known to have been taken largely on the recommendations of the IMF and IBRD, particularly the suggestions of these organizations' economic advisers in Pakistan--K. Schiller (former FRG minister of economics and finance) and R. McNamara (former U.S. secretary of defense and president of the IBRD). The idea of a market economy was ardently supported by Mahbub-ul-Haq, who again changed his mind about Pakistan's development strategy and is now the deputy chairman of the planning commission. Mahbub-ul-Haq insists that the private sector must be more active in the national economy, that the best possible conditions for this must be established and that the majority of state enterprises should be denationalized; he feels that the investment activity of the richest strata of Pakistani society should be encouraged in every way possible and is displaying less and less concern for social equality.²⁵ His theories have already been reflected in the first drafts of the sixth 5-year plan. As the progressive Lahore weekly VIEWPOINT reported, at the beginning of the 1980's Pakistan returned to the position it had occupied at the beginning of the second 5-year plan. The sixth 5-year plan, prepared by a clique of technocrats educated in the United States, will offer substantial opportunities for private capitalist enterprise and will give little attention to the social sector.²⁶

Of course, it would be naive to assume that the optimal balance of economic and social objectives and harmonious, uniform development can be achieved at all in countries taking the capitalist course of development. This is made virtually impossible just by the fact that these countries have already been drawn to a considerable extent into the world capitalist economy and are consequently vulnerable to the same crises as this economy and their economies will be marked by the same instability as this economy. When these countries strive for balanced growth, however, the effects of these problems on their chosen course of development are not necessarily decisive. The government can organize and promote balanced growth in the developing countries, and what is particularly significant in this connection is the reinforcement and enlargement of the state sector, the more efficient operation of state enterprises, the use of instruments of state regulation (primarily taxes) and the intelligent use of existing limited resources. The democratization of social life is an important condition of balanced development. In Pakistan today, now that all political parties have been banned and all life in the country is regulated by wartime laws, there is no possibility of social progress.

FOOTNOTES

16. For a more detailed discussion, see S. N. Kamenev, "Ekonomicheskiy rost Pakistana (analiz obshchestvennogo produkta)" [The Economic Growth of Pakistan (Analysis of the Social Product)], Moscow, 1977, pp 140-141.
17. "Pakistan Economic Survey 1981-82," Islamabad, 1982, Statistical Annexure, p 8.

18. VIEWPOINT, 22 July 1977.
19. MUSLIM, 3 November 1980.
20. M. H. Khan, "Underdevelopment and Agrarian Structure of Pakistan," Boulder (Colorado), 1981, p 17.
21. W. P. Zingel, "Pakistan's Economic Development," JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, Spring 1982, p 73.
22. "The Fifth Five Year Plan (1978-83)," Karachi, 1978, p 7.
23. Ibid., pp 36-37.
24. The collection of the ush'r intensified inequalities in income distribution because those who farm on the capitalist basis with the aid of modern agricultural methods (mainly landowners, rich peasants and others) enjoy substantial advantages in this tax structure).
25. VIEWPOINT, 1 April 1982.
26. Ibid., 9 December 1982.

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SKILLED-LABOR SHORTAGE FORCES CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICAN APARTHEID

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 83 pp 123-128

[Article by L. A. Vyalimaa: "The Apartheid Regime and the Non-White Urban Population of South Africa"]

[Text] Pieter Botha's government has recently tried to make the apartheid regime seem more attractive without changing its racist essence. At a party convention in August 1982, the ruling National Party approved the government's proposal regarding the "new distribution of political participation" and "full political participation for all within a pluralist system." Plans call for the creation of three separate parliamentary chambers: one for whites, another for the colored population, and a third for Indians. The Africans who make up more than 70 percent of the population, however, will be ineligible to participate in the new legislative body.

Almost half of the African population of South Africa is urban. The African urban population is now twice as great as the white population, and it will be three times as great by the end of the century.¹ The rapid growth of the urban African population is the result of high rates of economic growth in the past decade. The stages during which the economy was based primarily on farming and then on mining have given way to a stage of intensive investment in leading sectors of the processing industry. This has increased the demand for highly skilled manpower. The white working class displayed a tendency toward vertical mobility and almost became an employee social group in the late 1970's and early 1980's.² There has been a systematic reduction in the percentage of white workers in the processing industry and agriculture. The economically active white population has continued to move into the sphere of non-physical employment in the 1980's. The shortage of skilled manpower has become a problem in industry. The ISCOR metallurgical corporation reported in 1980, for example, that its force of mechanics was understaffed by 12 percent and that the private sector's appeal for white workers was the cause of a continuous loss of skilled labor (30 percent a year). Furthermore, around 40 percent of its white apprentices were subject to the draft, and the white labor unions object vehemently to the broader hiring of Africans and other non-whites. When a survey was conducted by the Natal Province Chamber of Commerce, 33 percent of the employers polled felt that the shortage of skilled labor was the main factor inhibiting production expansion. Similar opinions were expressed by the administrative director of the Sasol company

and by the administrators of the English and Afrikaner Chambers of Commerce. Since the shortage of skilled white labor has been projected at around 750,000 workers by the end of the current decade, it is obvious that the South African economy will depend more and more on non-white labor.³

At the beginning of 1981, South African Minister of Finance O. Horwood made a statement, obviously for demagogic purposes, about the need to expand the country's economic structure through the inclusion of the non-white population. In particular, he said: "The attainment of our goals in the sphere of economic development and the reduction of inflation will necessitate the connection of the process of economic development with the inclusion of Africans and other population groups in the army of skilled labor, in which their rights will be equal to those of whites. Our goal is to allow Africans, Asians and colored people to participate in the economy and in public life. We no longer have any use for an army of unskilled labor.... If we do not want to combine our progressive economy with more backward social development, the non-white population of the country must begin to create its own business community and participate in enterprises owned by whites."⁴

The shortage of skilled labor has kept the South African economy from developing intensively and uniformly. According to the data of the South African Institute of Racial Relations, the manpower shortage indicators in the country in 1977 were 9 percent in the case of skilled labor, 5.5 percent in the case of transportation workers and 28.4 percent in the case of production workers. In 1987 these figures will be 11.3 percent for skilled workers, 5.6 percent for transport workers and 27.7 percent for production workers.⁵ At the same time, there are many unemployed Africans in the country. The so-called homelands cannot solve the employment problems of the Africans living in them. The land allocated for these artificial administrative units, which were forcibly populated and consist of geographically fragmented territories, is largely unsuitable for cultivation and for the establishment of industrial enterprises. In 1980, 54 percent of the African population lived in the homelands. Government commissions studying the situation in these regions had to acknowledge that these reservations were overcrowded and were distinguished by economic underdevelopment, the poverty of their inhabitants and a high rate of unemployment. In "white" South Africa, on the other hand, the shortage of skilled manpower reached 705,000 workers in 1981.⁶ Employers accuse the National Party of not displaying enough concern or allocating enough funds for the education and professional training of Africans, the colored population and Indians, and declare that industrial development was being impeded by the shortage of skilled manpower.⁷

By the middle of the 1970's many National Party leaders realized that the South African economy would require the permanent employment of many Africans and that the African population of large industrial cities could no longer be treated as temporary residents. According to South African law, the right to live in cities is granted only to Africans covered by Section 10 of the 1945 Bantu (Urban) Unification Act. This law regulates African migration from the homelands to the cities of "white" South Africa. A 1970 law on citizenship in the homelands declared all Africans the citizens of a homeland regardless of their place of birth, residence or employment. In other words,

it deprived all Africans of South African citizenship. Until recently the authorities acted as if African suburban neighborhoods and African settlements near large industrial cities were refugee camps whose inhabitants would eventually have to return to their compulsory permanent place of residence--the homelands. However, for several reasons, primarily the shortage of skilled labor in industry and the growing dissatisfaction of the Africans with their status, the government has had to seek solutions acceptable by today's standards to the problems of urban Africans.

In 1977 the government set up a parliamentary commission under the chairmanship of Dr P. Rickert to review some laws regulating the living and working conditions of Africans in the cities. In February 1983 P. Botha informed the South African Parliament of the creation of a special commission to study the constitutional and economic problems of Africans, particularly those living in cities. The report submitted in 1979 by the Rickert commission focused on the notorious Section 10 of the 1945 Bantu Unification Act and its subsequent amendments. The commission found that just the hiring of black labor was regulated 25 laws and that the migration of blacks to cities was controlled by at least another 2,000 laws and official decrees. In the past decade around 5 million black inhabitants, or half of the entire black population of the country's "white regions," were arrested on the basis of these laws. In 1978 the pretext of permit law violations was used in 273,000 arrests, or 50,000 more than during the previous year. Almost 40 percent of the blacks sentenced to prison were charged with "curfew" violations. Their crime consisted mainly in failing to leave neighborhoods where they are not allowed to live within 72 hours.

In 1979 the government had to announce several measures for the partial improvement of the status of the African urban population, including the following:

1. The authorization of the issuance of 99-year leases to Africans in the cities of "white" South Africa (in the past Africans could only maintain permanent residences in the homelands).
2. The authorization of the wives and children of Africans with a "legal right" to be in cities to live with their husbands and fathers (in the past they had to remain in the homelands).
3. The adoption of a ruling on the improvement of African living conditions in the cities by means of the allocation of funds for housing construction and electrification in African urban neighborhoods.
4. The cancellation of some restrictions on the business and commercial activities of African businessmen, the authorization of Africans to own larger stores and the expansion of the urban neighborhoods in which Africans are allowed to operate businesses.
5. The decision to maintain Crossroads, a Capetown suburban settlement with a population of 20,000 which exists in violation of the law on segregation, and the cancellation of the plans to eradicate another African settlement--Alexandria in a suburb of Johannesburg.

6. The appointment of multiracial regional commissions to advise the administration on the problems of the African urban population. These measures should give Africans the illusion of participation in policymaking in "white" South Africa.

Although these measures are only declarations and promises of something better in the future, in the context of the present situation in South Africa they testify that ruling circles have had to revise the strategy of orthodox apartheid.

If these reforms are actually instituted, the economic and social changes they might make in the life of Africans authorized by South African law to live in the cities will turn these Africans into a particularly privileged substratum, thereby separating them from the rest of the African population and giving them access to better economic opportunities, the right to own homes, freedom of movement, educational opportunities and a higher standard of living in general. The huge differences that will exist between Africans living in the homelands and Africans with the right to live in cities can be judged from the information gathered by Dr J. Lange from the University of South Africa. If a worker from the Bophuthatswana homeland makes his way to neighboring Pretoria, works there just 3 months and spends the next 9 in jail for violating the residency permit law, he will still increase his annual income by 28.5 percent. A worker from the Leboa homeland who goes to Johannesburg and works there 6 months will increase his annual wage by 170 percent, even if he spends the other 6 months in jail.⁸ In 1973 and 1974 the wages of Africans working outside the homelands were almost 3 times as great as the entire gross domestic product of the reservations.⁹

When the government announced the proposed reforms and changes in policy on the urban African population, it also declared its intention to strictly limit the number of Africans authorized to live in urban neighborhoods and promised to institute stricter control over African migration from the homelands to the cities. This combination of a better situation for a few urban Africans on the one hand and a fundamentally unchanged policy with regard to the homelands and the multitudes of Africans living in them on the other reveals the true nature of the projected reforms and fits in with the strategy of the maintenance of white racist supremacy. In this way, the racists are trying to break up the ranks of apartheid's opponents, disunite the oppressed majority of the South African population and thereby strengthen the existing regime.

In recent years National Party leaders have considered the granting of some kind of political status to African urban neighborhoods, which might enjoy the rights of self-government in matters pertaining to several social problems, home ownership, education and the maintenance of law and order. P. Botha even mentioned the possibility of including some of the Africans with a legal right to live in cities within the administrative structure; the term "city-state" was used in this context.¹⁰

When the South African Government creates a new political structure for urban Africans, it will probably have to seek political and legal reinforcement of the new status of this population group. According to experts, the authorities

could choose one of the following possibilities: They can either form another self-governing homeland out of a group of large African urban settlements, which will be consistent with the policy of creating a new social community--"urban blacks" (according to official terminology) and will not represent any kind of significant departure from the policy of apartheid, or they can include the black-skinned South Africans with a legal right to live in cities in a parallel structure in a new constitutional proposal--that is, they can give them equal status with the colored and Indian population. This would be a greater departure from the policy of the "separate existence and development of the races" than the first option because the government would thereby acknowledge that at least some black-skinned South Africans have political "rights" outside the homeland structure.

The formation of the "urban African" group could be another way of fragmenting the African population--not according to ethnic features (as was the case when the homelands were formed), but according to the social community. The classic principle of the imperialist "divide and conquer" policy, which is reflected even in the South African Government's current manipulation of the non-white population, could lead to the formation of the kind of African group that will, as the racists hope, become an ally of the government and support its policy on the African majority. It was no coincidence that Prime Minister P. Botha announced that he foresaw for the urban Africans "a place in the galaxy of southern African states" which will, in his opinion, become "a fortress against Marxist infiltration."¹¹

The granting of economic, social and certain political advantages to Africans with a legal chance to live in the cities of "white" South Africa can be regarded as an attempt to secure the stability of the South African capitalist system. The social composition of this segment of the African population is heterogeneous: It includes representatives of the industrial proletariat, the small emerging African bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, municipal employees, the police and the lumpenproletariat.¹² Obviously, various elements of this group of urban Africans have different opinions of the regime's maneuvers and they have been assigned different places in the government's plans. But the white racists expect these Africans not to take part in the national liberation struggle of the entire non-white population after they have received certain privileges along with the legal opportunity to live in cities. After all, this struggle will represent a threat to their property, their desire for broader professional and commercial activity and their standard of living. The government expects the "urban Africans" to support strict migration controls just as resolutely because the urban overcrowding and social instability resulting from the infiltration of cities by illegal migrants will be contrary to their financial interests. A bill on the regulation of the traffic and settlement patterns of black individuals, which was recently submitted by the government to the South African Parliament, and other bills on the development of African settlements and on African local government will institute even stricter control over the migration of African "illegal" migrants to the cities and will secure the privileges of the "legal" urban Africans. Consequently, even though these reforms will be limited, they could be of some material benefit to the Africans who will thereby be given an opportunity to live in cities legally. These reforms

could exacerbate political, economic and social conflicts between urban Africans and Africans from the homelands. The South African Government hopes that the clash of these two groups of Africans will intensify the existing ethnic divisions institutionalized in the homeland structure.

As for the homelands, we can assume that the South African Government will continue to pressure their leaders to follow the example of the Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda in declaring their "independence." This policy would probably lead to the formation of an administrative structure consisting of four types of political units: firstly, "white" South Africa, made up of white, colored, Indian and perhaps "black urban" groups, all of which will be governed by their own parallel executive bodies in line with the government's announced "pluralist system"; secondly, increasingly large and consolidated "independent" homelands connected with "white" South Africa in something like a confederation; thirdly, the self-governing homelands growing out of reservations whose political leaders refuse "independence"; and possibly, fourthly, internal self-governed African city-states, but only if this group is not granted minority status in "white" South Africa and does not enjoy the same political "rights" as the colored and Indian population.

The administrative structure that might arise from all this is intended to secure the supremacy of the white minority through its "indirect" rule rather than the separation of African-inhabited territories from "white" South Africa. The structure is supposed to solve various problems: tax collection, social security, migration control and the maintenance of "law and order." Furthermore, whereas the control of black migration to the cities serves the South African Government as an effective means of combating "excessive urbanization," the homelands represent an equally effective way of concentrating the unemployed in these territories. The performance of all these administrative functions will be under the complete control of the government agencies of "white" South Africa. The only difference between this system of government and the orthodox strategy of segregation is that "indirect" rule will supposedly not exclude the African majority from positions of "political power." To this end, National Party leaders want to keep a certain segment of the African population within "white" South Africa; furthermore, these Africans will be granted the right of representation in legislative bodies and will have to assume some administrative responsibilities, however limited they might be. Therefore, from the standpoint of guaranteed strict control over the situation within the country, the reforms now proposed with regard to the "urban Africans" are supposed to assign two functions to this part of the population: the function of separation from the Africans exiled to the homelands and the function of cooperation with the white racists on the basis of the two sides' common interest in strict migration control. For the Africans this is primarily an economic interest; as for the white population, the uncontrolled infiltration of South African cities by Africans could be dangerous for political reasons. In its forecast of government economic and social policy in the 1980's, the Rickert Commission warned: "Present conditions in South Africa make the control of urbanization absolutely essential in the safeguarding of public security. Even if...doing away with this kind of control would accelerate economic growth, direct and indirect social implications would make the price too high."¹³

Therefore, when the government was planning the current reforms, it was trying to laid the foundations for a future "pluralistic South Africa," consisting of whites, coloreds, Indians and urban Africans. The Botha Government hopes to create some kind of buffer between the white minority and black majority by condemning the latter to life in the homelands and regarding them as "foreigners" in "white" South Africa.

This government's strategy consists in cooperating with conciliatory elements of certain African social strata and influencing international public opinion. It is unlikely that the South African authorities will be able to prevent change for long. The prevailing mood of the urban African population does not give the government any grounds to anticipate the success of its strategy and its plans in the foreseeable future. The regime can count on support for its plans only if whites give up their privileges. The government cannot agree to this. The urban Africans, however, are making increasingly loud demands for equality--social, economic and political.

FOOTNOTES

1. S. Jenkins, "The Great Evasion. South Africa: A Survey," THE ECONOMIST, 21 June 1980, p 14.
2. In 1977, 70.8 percent of the whites were employed in the non-production sphere ("Yuzhno-Afrikanskaya Respublika" [Republic of South Africa], Moscow, 1982, p 58).
3. S. Jenkins, Op. cit., p 10.
4. DANIEL HUNNIBELLS INTERNATIONAL LETTER, 8 February 1981.
5. "Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1981," Johannesburg, 1982, p 124.
6. "Yuzhno-Afrikanskaya Respublika," p 55.
7. For a more detailed discussion, see V. M. Sharinova, "South Africa: The 'Color Barrier,'" NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1983, No 1.
8. S. Jenkins, Op. cit., p 19.
9. "Yuzhno-Afrikanskaya Respublika," p 50.
10. DIE BURGER, 13 August 1979.
11. Ibid.
12. The social structure of the group of urban Africans is analyzed in V. P. Gorodnov's work "Chernyye zhiteli 'belogo' goroda. (Zhizn' i bor'ba afrikanskogo getto)" [The Black Inhabitants of the "White" City. (Life and Struggle in the African Ghetto)], Moscow, 1983.
13. Quoted by S. Jenkins, Op. cit., p 19.

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